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For over thirty years, there has been an ongoing debate over the continued
viability of the personal and corporate income tax systems and the need for
change.1 Several governments—including the United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and Sweden—have conducted studies considering the
merits of changing their current income tax systems to systems based on a cash
flow, consumption-style tax.2 To date, not one country has replaced its income
+

Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University.
1. William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1113–22 (1974) (providing one of the earliest accounts of the possible
advantages of a consumption-style tax).
2. THE INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION
33–45 (1978) (comparing ways to reform the tax system of the United Kingdom including a
discussion of measuring one’s tax base through consumption) [hereinafter THE MEADE REPORT];
SVEN-OLOF LODIN, PROGRESSIVE EXPENDITURE TAX—AN ALTERNATIVE? A REPORT OF THE
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tax with a direct consumption tax.3
Several concrete proposals have been proffered for replacing the income tax
with cash flow or consumption taxes.4 In the United States, Robert Hall and
Alvin Rabushka—the pioneers of this field—proposed a uniform flat rate tax
on all businesses, which would allow for an immediate deduction for all costs,
including wages, and a uniform flat tax rate on wages received by individuals.5
Other popular consumption tax proposals include the Unlimited Savings
Allowance (USA) tax system6 and the Business Activities Tax (BAT).7 The
1972 GOVERNMENT COMMISSION ON TAXATION 21–29 (1978) (providing a discussion of the
arguments for and against implementing an expenditure tax in the Swedish tax system); REPORT
OF COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO INFLATION AND TAXATION 464–68 (1975) (discussing a
proposal for a cash flow concept tax system in Australia) [hereinafter MATHEWS COMM.
REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 9–15 (1977)
(discussing potential reforms to the United States’ federal income tax by presenting, among other
ideas, a model for a cash flow consumption tax) [hereinafter BASIC TAX REFORM].
3. CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR. & GEORGE E. ZODROW, CONSUMPTION-BASED DIRECT
TAXES: A GUIDED TOUR OF THE AMUSEMENT PARK 3 (2007) (reporting on several countries that
considered cash flow direct taxes but did not adopt them).
4. See, e.g., DAVID E. BRADFORD, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN CONSUMPTION TAXATION
5–18 (1996) (proposing a consumption tax in the form of a value-added tax and discussing its
relationship to income tax); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an
Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does It Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377,
392–403 (1992) (discussing whether a consumption tax is risky and potentially unfair); Michael J.
Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1575–77,
1584–97 (1979) (describing a consumption tax as more economically efficient and outlining its
general structure); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Taxed Under an Income Tax Is
Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REV. 1, 2–15 (1996) (comparing four methods for
exempting capital income within a cash flow tax system) [hereinafter How Much Capital Taxed];
Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081,
1093–1121 (1980) (discussing several factors that make a consumption tax fairer than an income
tax, including utility, discrimination towards savers, and the defectiveness of measuring income).
5. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed., Hoover Institutional
Press 1995).
6. The USA system suggests a flat-rate business tax on domestic gross profits and a
graduated individual tax, which permits savings deductions. Alliance USA, Unlimited Savings
Allowance (USA) Tax System, 66 TAX NOTES 1482, 1487–90 (1995).
7. The BAT replaces the corporate income tax with a consumption-style tax while
retaining the individual income tax. OFFICE OF TAX POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 19–37 (2007) [hereinafter THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY]. The BAT is essentially
a value-added tax (VAT) that differs from the European-style VAT—which uses a tax credit
method—by taxing added value using the subtraction method. Id. at 20–21, 37. The BAT was
originally supported by Senators John Danforth and David Boren and was re-proposed by the
Bush Administration in a 2007 Treasury Study. See George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski,
Introduction: The Fundamental Question in Fundamental Tax Reform, in UNITED STATES TAX
REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski eds., 2002)
[hereinafter TAX REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY]. Although this Article focuses on direct
consumption taxes like sales taxes or VATs, the BAT is mentioned here because the Treasury
recommendation was that the BAT would replace the income tax on businesses. THE 2007
TREASURY STUDY, supra, at 19.
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primary argument in favor of replacing income taxes with consumption taxes is
that there would be a dramatic increase in national productivity,8 but many
scholars vigorously contest the estimated level of economic growth that would
result.9
Economic models have shed considerable light on the relative merits of
income versus consumption taxation; nevertheless, these models do have
limitations.10 Most models assume a closed economy, which ignores the
tremendous impact world trade and capital flows have on the merits, design,
and implementation of income and consumption taxes.11 Even those models
that try to simulate an open economy employ an over-simplified view of the
tax treatment of foreign source income and thus do not adequately address the
complexities of taxes in an economically open, highly competitive world.12
Finally, these comparative models—simulating both an open and closed
economy—assume an ideal income tax, which is quite different from our
present system.13 Consequently, analytical completeness demands a different
perspective on the subject.
This different point of view is a global perspective and it serves as the
central focus of this Article. A global perspective analyzes tax regimes that
must deal with worldwide economic forces of free trade, competitive capital
markets, and the increasing mobility of many factors of production.14 A global
perspective starts with the reality of an open economy, not one that is closed.15
Instead of taking a purely theoretical economic perspective, a global
perspective takes account of the actual, imprecise laws of nations regarding the
ever-changing flows of international transactions.16 Analysis must also
confront the reality that nations compete for mobile economic activity through
the use of tax incentives.17 Not surprisingly, viewing the relative merits of

8. THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 19; Zodrow & Mieszkowski, supra note
7, at 2–3.
9. See Zodrow & Mieszkowski, supra note 7, at 2–6.
10. See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle, Behavioral Responses to a Consumption Tax, in TAX
REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 7, at 25–28.
11. See Charles L. Ballard, International Aspects of Fundamental Tax Reform, in TAX
REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 7, at 109–10, 132–38 (comparing outcomes from
“Closed-Economy Simulation Models,” which are frequently used, and “Open-Economy
Simulation Models,” which are used less frequently).
12. See id. at 134–38; see also Gravelle, supra note 10, at 42.
13. See Ballard, supra note 11, at 132–38.
14. See William B. Barker, International Tax Reform Should Begin at Home: Replace the
Corporate Income Tax with a Territorial Expenditure Tax, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 647, 647
(2010).
15. See Ballard, supra note 11, at 132–38.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See William B. Barker, Optimal International Taxation and Tax Competition:
Overcoming the Contradictions, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 161, 172 (2002) (providing an
account of the effect of tax competition on nations’ tax systems).
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income and consumption taxes from a global perspective yields different
insights and conclusions.
This different perspective indicates that serious consideration should be
given to adopting a cash flow, consumption-style, or expenditure-type tax on
corporations and other large businesses. Limiting a cash flow tax to
corporations and other large businesses distinguishes this Article from other
popular proposals because it leaves intact the personal income tax on wages,
earnings, and capital income of individuals.18 For instance, the proposed cash
flow tax differs from a value added tax, such as the BAT, in that it allows the
deduction of labor costs.19 In addition, this new global perspective prompts the
adoption of a destination-based, cash flow tax contrary to other popular
consumption-type, origin-based taxes.20
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I deals with the practical
problems of income taxation of corporations and what makes reform of the
corporate income tax system formidable. Part II sets out the elements of a cash
flow tax and illustrates how a cash flow tax remedies the inadequacies of an
income tax. This Part also discusses the virtues of a destination-based cash
flow tax as compared to other tax proposals. Part III explores the economic
differences between income and cash flow taxes and demonstrates how these
systems approach the taxation of capital income on a practical level. Part IV
explains why a cash flow tax on only corporations is justified considering
efficiency, justice, and politics as well as how a cash flow tax works in concert
with an income tax on individuals.
I. THE DEFICIENCIES OF A CORPORATE INCOME TAX
The corporate income tax has been in continuous operation in the United
States for over 100 years.21 Recently, however, the executive branch has made
corporate tax reform a priority.22 President Obama’s corporate tax proposal
provides for broadening the corporate tax base by eliminating various tax
deductions and credits attributable to loopholes while concurrently lowering
the statutory corporate tax rate.23 There are two main goals of this reform.
18. See infra Part II.A–B.
19. See THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 19.
20. See, e.g., HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 5, at 53–64; THE MEADE REPORT, supra note
2, at 33–37 (proposing origin-based cash flow taxes); see also infra Part II.B (discussing the
similarities and differences between an origin-based and a destination-based cash flow tax).
21. Tariff Act of Aug. 5 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112–13. The 1909 Act imposed a
special tax of 1% of net income above $5,000 for all corporations, joint stock companies, or
associations, including foreign entities engaged in business in the United States. Id.
22. See Eric Kroh, Obama Asks Business Leaders to Aid Corporate Tax Reform Efforts, 130
TAX NOTES 745, 745 (2011) (reporting President Obama’s recent efforts to engage the business
community on tax reform).
23. See THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM, A JOINT REPORT BY
THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 9–10 (2012) [hereinafter 2012
JOINT REPORT] (outlining these proposals).
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The first goal is to simplify the system and substantially reduce the burden of
tax compliance, which currently costs corporations approximately 40 billion
dollars per year or 12% of revenues collected.24 The second goal is to increase
the competitive posture of American companies at home and abroad by
lowering tax rates and decreasing the costs of accessing new capital.25
President Obama’s underlying objective is to accomplish these goals in a
revenue-neutral fashion, thus requiring the effects of lower rates to be offset by
a broader tax base, achieved primarily through the elimination of tax
preferences.26
Businesses voicing an opinion on the suggested reforms have reacted in a
predictable way, wishing to preserve current tax incentives while approving
rate reduction.27 The reason is obvious: tax preferences affect various
enterprises differently and reforms would produce substantial winners and
losers. A recent study indicates that if all major tax expenditures other than
accelerated depreciation were eliminated, Congress would be able to lower the
corporate tax rate from 35% to 28%.28 One study found, however, that this
reduction could provide as much as a 12.3% decrease in taxes to some
industries and as great as a 69.7% increase to others.29
Substantial base broadening with a lower rate would be a significant
achievement, simplifying the corporate tax code and eliminating some reasons
for tax planning, which would produce savings in compliance costs for
corporations.30 The case for enhancing the competitiveness of U.S. enterprises
is obscure, however, because as long as the reform is revenue neutral, the
amount of taxes paid by corporations will, in itself, have little effect on overall

24. Id. at 3–4, 65.
25. Id. at 69–72.
26. See id.; see also Kroh, supra note 22, at 745 (“In a speech at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, . . . [President] Obama argued that the federal government’s interests are aligned with
those of business owners and that revenue-neutral corporate tax reform would be of mutual
benefit.”).
27. See Kroh, supra note 22, at 745 (noting that in private meetings with administration
officials, some business leaders have requested that overall corporate tax rate cuts not be offset by
the elimination of tax subsidies).
28. See 2012 JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 9–10 (noting the top federal tax rate of 35%);
see also Martin A. Sullivan, Winners and Losers in Corporate Tax Reform, 130 TAX NOTES 731,
731 (2011) (citing THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 48–49); infra text accompanying
note 39 (describing accelerated depreciation).
29. Sullivan, supra note 28, at 733 tbl.2A. The five greatest winners would be securities,
insurance, credit intermediation, retail trade, and bank holding companies. Id. The five biggest
losers would be electrical products, transport equipment, computers and electronics, technical
services, and agriculture. Id.
30. See 2012 JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 9–10.
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competitiveness.31 Further, many tax incentives are aimed at enhancing the
competitiveness of U.S. businesses internationally.32
A different goal of corporate tax reform should be to restructure the tax in a
way that would provide a source of sustainable revenue to the government,
especially in times of large public deficits, such as the current situation.
Although the United States has one of the highest statutory corporate tax rates,
the current corporate tax system does not result in comparatively high
corporate tax revenues.33 Between 2000 and 2005, the United States’
corporate tax revenue was only 2.2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
whereas OECD countries averaged 3.5%.34 The United States’ corporate tax
revenue has decreased as a share of U.S. GDP from a high of 4.5% in the
mid-1960s,35 despite the fact that overall tax revenues have increased from
nearly 25% of GDP to approximately 28% of GDP between 1965 and 1998.36
These low figures for corporate tax revenues are surprising when related to the
level of control that corporations exercise over the national economy. In 2008,
receipts from all businesses in the United States exceeded thirty-four trillion
dollars.37 Of these receipts, over twenty-eight trillion dollars were attributable
to corporations alone, resulting in corporations representing 84% of all
receipts.38

31. See infra notes 48–59 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 199, 861, 863 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (providing tax deductions for
domestic production and manufacturing activities and special rules regarding the reporting of
inventory property sales); Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3 (outlining the inventory property sales source
rules); see also 2012 JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 13–14.
33. See THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 6–10.
34. Id. at 10.
35. OECD, TAX POLICY STUDIES NO. 6, TAX AND THE ECONOMY, A COMPARATIVE
ASSESSMENT OF OECD COUNTRIES 13 fig.2 (2001).
36. Id.
37. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TABLE 1. NUMBER OF RETURNS, TOTAL RECEIPTS,
BUSINESS RECEIPTS, NET INCOME (LESS DEFICIT), NET INCOME, AND DEFICIT BY FORM OF
BUSINESS, TAX YEARS 1980–2008 [hereinafter IRS TABLE 1].
38. The exact figures for 2008 were $34,608,202,747,000 in total receipts for all businesses,
with $28,589,771,221,000 attributable to just corporations. Id. The Bureau of Economic
Analysis reached similar results.

Domestic Business
Corporate Business
Percentage

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

8,687.5*
6,435.0
74.1%

9,336.8
6,897.4
73.9%

9,511.4
6,992.2
73.5%

9,490.4
6,907.5
73.4%

8,958.2
6,655.7
74.3%

* All numbers billions.
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS,
TABLE 1.13, NATIONAL INCOME BY SECTOR, LEGAL FORM OF ORGANIZATIONS AND TYPE OF
INCOME (2011).
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A 2007 U.S. Department of the Treasury study attributed the low yield, in
part, to the narrowness of the corporate tax base created by certain tax
preferences, such as deductions for domestic production and manufacturing
activities, research and experimentation credits, allowing immediate expensing
deductions for some capital costs, and accelerated depreciation.39 The study
estimated that the total corporate revenue offset by tax preferences alone was
$932 billion over ten years.40 This reduction in corporate net income
represents 8.6% of net taxable corporate income for 2007.41 If the
government’s goal was to increase revenue from corporations instead of
maintaining revenue neutrality, eliminating tax preferences would be a step in
the right direction. Although tax preferences account for a part of low
corporate tax yield, the decline in corporate tax revenues is also the result of
four other critically important factors.
The first important factor is the availability of pass-through tax alternatives
to the traditional C corporate form.42 These alternatives include subchapter S
corporations, limited liability entities, and partnerships.43 The use of these
alternatives has increased dramatically over the years. In 1980, approximately
87% of U.S. business measured by receipts was in C corporations, with
approximately 3% in S corporations and 4% in partnerships (including limited
liability companies).44 By 2008, C corporations’ share of receipts was
substantially reduced in favor of pass-through entities; C corporations
accounted for only 63%, whereas S corporations (17.7%) and partnerships
(13.6%) greatly increased their shares.45 Extending the corporate tax to large
non-corporate business enterprises could substantially reverse this trend.
39. THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 47–48.
40. Id. at 48 tbl.3.1.
41. This is found by dividing $93.2 billion by the C corporation 2008 net of $1.078770
trillion. See IRS TABLE 1, supra note 37, at 44.
42. Corporations,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=98240,00.html (last visited Jul. 13, 2012)
(describing a C corporation, which “is recognized as a separate taxpaying entity”); see also 2012
JOINT REPORT supra note 23, at 7 (discussing the differing tax structures for a traditional C
corporation and other businesses, such as sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations).
REVENUE
SERV.,
43. S
Corporations,
INTERNAL
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=98263,00.html (last visited Jul. 13, 2012)
(“S corporations are corporations that elect to pass corporate income, losses, deductions, and
credit[s] through to their shareholders for federal tax purposes.”); see also 2012 JOINT REPORT,
supra note 23, at 7.
44. The figures for 1980 are C corporations: 6,133,036,929,000 in total receipts out of
7,064,487,840,000 total receipts for all businesses; S corporations: 210,322,424,000 in total
receipts out of 7,064,487,840,000 for all businesses; and Partnerships: 291,998,115,000 in total
receipts out of 7,064,487,840,000 for all businesses. IRS TABLE 1, supra note 37.
45. The figures for 2008 are C corporations: 21,914,035,420,00 in total receipts out of
34,608,202,747,000 for all businesses; S corporations: 6,126,386,899 in total receipts out of
34,608,202,747,000 for all businesses; and Partnerships: 4,700,988,521,000 out of
34,608,202,747,000 for all businesses. Id.
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The other three important factors do not involve loopholes, but involve
critical systemic problems of the corporate income tax. The second important
factor, the deductibility of interest on debt, plays a large role in reducing the
corporate tax base.46 Although the United States has one of the highest
statutory corporate tax rates in the world, the impact of the statutory rate is
misleading in large part due to the deduction of interest.47 The true measure of
taxation is the Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR).48 A 2007 international
study showed the United States’ EMTR in comparison with other countries
was as follows:
TABLE I
Present
Discounted
Value of
Depreciation
AllowanceEquipment
(Equity)
79
75
76

Statutory
Corporate
Income Tax
Rate*
Country
United States
39
OECD Average
31
G-7 Average
36
* Includes local corporate taxes.49

Effective
Marginal Tax
Rate –
Equipment
(Equity)
24
20
24

Effective
Marginal Tax
Rate –
Equipment
(Debt)
-46
-32
-39

According to the original data in 2005, U.S. corporations were actually taxed
less than their G-7 competitors.50 Table I shows that the U.S. average tax on

46. See 2012 JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 5 (“[I]nterest paid by businesses (both
corporate and non-corporate) is deductible . . . . The current system therefore results in high
effective tax rates on equity-financed investments and low effective rates on
debt-financed investment. This provides incentives for businesses to finance new investments
with debt, and to maintain a higher level of debt in their capital structure, increasing the
likelihood of financial distress and bankruptcy.”); see also infra Part I.A.
47. See 2012 JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 19–20 (noting the United States’ top statutory
federal corporate tax rate of 35%, which, combined with the state corporate tax rates, creates a
39% overall top statutory corporate tax rate). At the time of the 2007 Treasury Study, the United
States was second only to Japan for OECD countries, which had a 40% corporate tax rate. See
THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 6.
48. See THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 8 (noting the inaccuracies of the
statutory corporate tax rate as compared to the EMTR, which “combines corporate tax rates,
depreciation allowances, and other features of the tax system into a single measure of the share of
an investment’s economic income needed to cover taxes over its lifetime”).
49. Id. at 7 tbl.1.1 (citing Corporate Tax Database, INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES (2005),
http://www.ifs.org.uk).
50. Id. (showing the U.S. EMTR (24%) to be less than Canada (25%), Germany (29%), and
Japan (28%)); see also id. at 12 tbl.1.3 (listing G-7 countries as Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
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new equity investment was the same as the G-7 average (24%), whereas the
U.S. average tax on debt-financed investments was lower than the G-7 average
(negative 46% and 39% respectively).51 Table I also shows that in 2005, U.S.
corporations—in comparison to all OECD countries—were taxed similarly,
paying effectively 24% as compared with 20% for equity investments and
negative 46% as compared with negative 32% for debt-financed investment.52
Furthermore, in comparison with other OECD countries, the United States
provides a relatively generous structure for certain tax incentives, particularly
accelerated depreciation, as evidenced by row one of Table I.53 The conclusion
from all of this data is that U.S. corporations do not face a substantially
different tax burden than other nations’ corporations even though U.S.
corporations face one of the highest statutory rates.
The third important factor—the drain on the corporate income tax resulting
from the tax rules that apply to corporations internationally—is substantial.
Nations today face grave challenges to their tax systems as the result of other
nations using their tax systems to compete for business activity.54 For over a
century, the United States has vigorously pursued the taxation of residents’
economic activity outside the United States and the domestic activity of
foreign persons.55 However, these rules do not yield significant revenue from
foreign operations.56
The fourth important factor is the reduction of the tax base by the deduction
of imports. Increased imports directly cause a reduction of the corporate tax
base even where the production is by U.S.-owned foreign corporations.57 In

Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States (citing Int’l Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
(2007a)).
51. Supra TABLE I.
52. Supra TABLE I.
53. Supra TABLE I; see also THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 9. Tax
incentives, particularly accelerated depreciation, first account for the drop from the U.S. statutory
rate of 39% to the EMTR of 24% for equity capital, with an additional drop from 24% to negative
46% EMTR for debt capital. Supra TABLE I.
54. See Barker, supra note 17, at 171–80 (providing general treatment of international tax
competition).
55. See id. at 182–84 (detailing the history of the United States’ comprehensive taxation,
both foreign and domestic).
56. See infra Part I.B. The present U.S. tax system, which includes residence taxation with
deferral for foreign incorporated entities and foreign tax credits for U.S. corporations, produces
little revenue. See Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Where Will They Go if We Go
Territorial?
Dividend Exemption and the Location Decisions of U.S. Multinational
Corporations, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 787, 798 (2001) (finding that tax on repatriated earnings of
multinational corporations can be approximately 3%).
57. See Alan J. Auerbach et al., Taxing Corporate Income, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN
837, 853–55 (Stuart Adams et al. eds., 2010) (discussing the impact of taxation on multinational
corporate decisions).
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2007, net imports (the excess of imports over exports) represented 5% of U.S.
GDP.58
Although base broadening and a lower statutory rate should make the
corporate tax system simpler and reduce compliance costs, these reforms do
not address four of the most fundamental problems of the corporate tax system.
Two of these features, the disparity in treatment of debt and equity and the
problems of international taxation and tax competition, warrant further
consideration.59
A. Debt v. Equity in the Corporate Setting
The growth of new types of financial products has made it difficult for tax
authorities to distinguish between debt and equity.60 Financial derivatives and
other hybrid instruments have narrowed the distinction to such an extent that
the distinction is meaningless in many cases.61 Yet, the disparate treatment of
debt and equity remains one of the most important features of corporate
taxation.62
The United States applies a system of economic double taxation on
corporate profits attributable to equity capital.63 In general, the return on
equity investments is taxed both at the corporate level and at the shareholder
level as dividends or capital gains.64
Despite the two-level tax structure, the U.S. system does have some complex
trade-offs. Prior to the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003,65 corporate dividends were simply taxed as ordinary income at regular
58. See Alan J. Auerbach, A Modern Corporation Tax, THE HAMILTON PROJECT Dec. 2010,
at 13, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/12/corporate%
20tax%20auerbach/12_corporate_tax_auerbach.pdf.
59. The remaining two features—the problematic use of pass-through entities and the
impact of imports—are examined further in the discussion of cash flow taxes. See infra Part II.B.
In particular, the use of pass-through entities for large businesses could be addressed by
reforming income taxation or cash flow taxation. Both systems could address this problem by
applying corporate tax to large non-corporate business. In addition, a destination-based cash flow
tax directly addresses the problem of imports. See infra Part II.
60. See BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, 1 FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, ch. 4 (7th ed. 2006) (discussing the issue of debt versus
equity, including classification issues as well as the use of hybrid debt and hybrid-equity vehicles,
which further challenge classification schemes); Robert E. Culbertson & Jamie E. King, U.S.
Rules on Earnings Stripping: Background Structure and Treaty Interaction, 29 TAX NOTES INT’L
1161, 1161 (2003).
61. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 859.
62. See id. at 857–58.
63. See THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 43.
64. Id. at 51. To the extent that profits are not distributed to shareholders, these after-tax
profits may be taxed to shareholders upon sales of shares to the extent these profits are reflected
in the sale price of the shares. Id.
65. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117
Stat. 752 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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rates.66 Today, qualified corporate dividends are taxed at the taxpayer’s top
marginal rate or 15%—whichever is lower.67 Double taxation is also mitigated
somewhat by the treatment of retained earnings, which are only subject to the
corporate tax and not the individual income tax.68 To the extent that a
shareholder indirectly realizes these profits through a sale of shares, they
would be subject to an individual income tax at the maximum rate for capital
gains of 15%.69 This indirect second tax on retained corporate earnings is
deferred until the shareholder disposes of his or her investment.70 The effect of
deferral results in a substantial reduction of taxpayers’ income from capital
invested in shares.71 One study estimated that the effective rate on capital
gains from shares was between one-quarter and one-third of the statutory rate
due to deferral.72 It has also been estimated that approximately one-half of
corporate capital gains escape taxation altogether when held by taxpayers at
death.73
The tax treatment of corporate debt is quite different from equity. Interest
accrued on corporate debt is deductible from corporate profits.74 As shown in
Table I, the treatment of debt financing results in a U.S. EMTR of negative
46% for debt-financed capital used in corporate activity,75 while the U.S.
EMTR for equity financing is positive 24%.76 The result is that the
combination of tax incentives and debt financing produces a substantial

66. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 857.
67. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1), (h)(11) (2006) (treating qualified corporate dividends as capital gains
with a 15% maximum tax rate). The 15% maximum rate mitigates the effect of double taxation
for those in the higher income tax brackets that exceed 15%. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57,
at 13.
68. See THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 221 (Mervyn A. King & Don Fullerton
eds., 1984) (noting that retaining earnings creates a deferral advantage on later potential personal
income tax).
69. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (providing a 15% maximum rate for long-term capital gains from the
sale of corporate securities).
70. See Jane G. Gravelle, The Corporate Income Tax: Economic Issues and Policy Options,
48 NAT’L TAX J. 267, 270–71 (1995).
71. See THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 51.
72. See THE CAPITAL GAINS CONTROVERSY: A TAX ANALYSTS READER 1 (J. Andrew
Hoerner ed., rev. ed. 1992).
73. See THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL, supra note 68, at 221 (“[N]o capital
gains taxes are paid out of the estate, but the basis for calculating capital gains of the new owner
is set equal to market value at the time of inheritance.”). The transfer of property at death is not a
taxable event. See I.R.C. § 1001. Those who receive property through inheritance are entitled to
a fair market value basis in the property. Id. § 1014.
74. See I.R.C. § 163. Therefore, to the extent of interest payments, the profit earned through
the use of debt is not subject to corporate tax. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 4. Interest
payments are included in the income of creditors and taxed at the creditor’s applicable rates.
75. See supra TABLE I.
76. See supra TABLE I.
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government subsidy to corporations.77 In contrast, the return on new equity
capital is subject to corporate level tax and results in a positive rate of tax.78
In an ideal corporate income tax system, the rate of tax on the return to
debt-financed investment should be zero.79 Currently, the negative rate of tax
is created largely by the special tax preferences in the corporate system that
cause the real system to deviate substantially from that ideal.80 Because both
forms of capital currently enjoy these preferences, the gap between debt and
equity would remain unchanged if preferences were eliminated.81 For
example, reducing the maximum tax rate from 35% to 31% would lessen the
corporate tax incidence on equity and would slightly reduce the tax benefit of
debt financing.82 However, closer is not the same; the difference in treatment
should be exactly the bite of the actual corporate tax rate.
One proposal made by President Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory
Board was to limit the deductibility of net interest.83 For example, one plan
could be to limit the deductibility of interest expense to 90% for payments of
more than $5 million per year.84 The estimate is that this plan would allow the
corporate tax rate to be lowered by roughly .7%.85 Although such a provision
might have some effect on the amount of corporate debt, it does very little to
change the fundamental difference between debt and equity.86
B. International Taxation and the Corporate Income Tax Base
Effective international taxation begins with the determination of the tax
base—or what and who to tax.87 The concerns are the fair and efficient
taxation of both resident taxpayers with foreign income generated by
transactions and operations abroad, and foreign persons with domestic income
77. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
78. See supra TABLE I.
79. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 3 (proposing a tax system whereby the treatment
of debt would mirror the treatment of equity—“taxable when borrowed but deductible when
repaid”).
80. See 2012 JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 5–6.
81. An important tax advantage of deducting the return on debt-financed investment is that
the interest deducted by corporations is nominal interest, which includes an inflationary
component. To cure this defect, the tax system should index the interest deduction for inflation.
See James Mackie, Unfinished Business of the 1986 Tax Reform Act: An Effective Tax Rate
Analysis Of Current Issues In The Taxation Of Capital Income, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 293, 294 (2002).
Though the income tax over-taxes interest income because it includes the inflationary component,
it under-taxes income financed by debt. See infra Part III (providing a further discussion of
interest).
82. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
83. 2012 JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 9–10.
84. Id. at 73.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 74.
87. See Barker, supra note 14, at 651.
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generating transactions and operations in the United States.88 Although these
objects appear to justify two different, but analogous tax bases—(1) the U.S.
domestic source tax base for foreign corporations and (2) the foreign source
tax base for U.S. resident corporations89—there are two other critical base
considerations. These bases are the net income earned by U.S.-owned foreign
corporations, which are tax-exempt, and the domestic source base for U.S.
corporations.90
Generally, there are two primary international taxation regimes: territorial
taxation and residence taxation.91 For U.S. corporations, the United States has
adopted a residence taxation regime, which taxes the worldwide income
generated by domestic and foreign operations transactions.92 However, this
regime is elective in many instances due to the ability of U.S. corporations to
conduct foreign activities through foreign-incorporated subsidiaries.93 For
foreign corporations, the United States has adopted a territorial taxation regime
that only taxes income generated in connection with the United States.94
Although worldwide taxation and territorial taxation are conceptually quite
distinct, both systems share many problems that are inherent with a global tax
Therefore, effective international taxation must begin with
regime.95
establishing and isolating these tax bases.
The concept of territory is critical to all of these tax bases. National borders,
however, lose their traditional economic meaning when viewed from the
perspective of multinational enterprises and their global activities.96
International tax reform’s “primary focus should be protecting the domestic tax
base [of both resident and non-resident corporations] from erosion that is
caused by mischaracterizing and misvaluing foreign and domestic income.”97
International income tax laws have proved largely ineffective at preventing this
erosion. Actual international tax reform has lacked both theoretical and
political consensus on what should be done.98
88. Id. at 652.
89. Id. at 651–52.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 650. Territorial, or source taxation, “is based on the proposition that a country has
the right to tax income that has ‘arisen’ in that country.” Id. Residence, or domiciliary taxation,
“is a personal jurisdiction approach; a nation seeks to tax its residents on income irrespective of
source.” Id.
92. Id. at 650–51.
93. Id. at 651 (noting that, “[i]n general, income earned by U.S. owned foreign corporations
is deferred until repatriation”).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 650–52.
96. Id. at 650.
97. Id. at 651–52.
98. For example, in April 2010, Northwestern Law School held a symposium that brought
together government officials from both Democratic and Republican administrations, academics,
business representatives, and tax practitioners to address the problems and needs of international
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Although territorial taxation of foreign-owned corporations in the United
States does not typically receive the political and scholarly attention that
worldwide taxation does, its importance should not be underestimated.99 In
regard to all corporations doing business in the United States, foreign-owned
corporations account for about 10% of the U.S. economy.100 Without U.S.
taxation of foreign enterprises doing business in the United States comparable
to U.S. taxation of domestic corporations, U.S. corporations could experience a
substantial competitive tax disadvantage.101
To see this, examine the three basic components of U.S. territorial taxation
of foreign-owned corporations. The first, the source of income within a
territory, is a process of linking the production of income to a taxing
jurisdiction.102 The second is the threshold for taxation of corporate business.
In general, business income under the Internal Revenue Code is not taxed
unless it is effectively connected with a trade or business within the United
States103 or, as modified by treaty, is not taxed unless it is connected with a
permanent establishment located within the United States.104 The third
component is the type of tax. Territorial tax is a tax on net income applied in
the same fashion as applied to domestic taxpayers.105 Where U.S.-sourced
income is not subject to business tax rules, it can be taxed on a gross basis.106
Theoretically, worldwide taxation of U.S. corporations is not concerned with
these limitations. U.S. corporations are taxed on their worldwide income no
matter where it is sourced.107 However, the scope of worldwide corporate
taxation is dramatically affected by two major factors. The first is that the
tax reform. Hilary Hurd Anyaso, Northwestern Law Hosts International Tax Reform Symposium,
NORTHWESTERN UNIV. (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories
/2010/04/taxadvisory.html. Though many different approaches were examined, agreement on
reform of the international tax income system lacks any hope of consensus. The reason is simple;
no plan yet advanced does much to improve the situation. See David L. Cameron and Philip F.
Postlewaite, Symposium on International Tax Reform in a Reset Economy: Introduction, 30 NW.
J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 505, 514 (2010).
99. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION
ch.6, at 266 (2003) (devoting only one chapter to inbound business transactions).
100. See Cletus C. Coughlin, Foreign Owned Companies in the United States: Malign or
Benign? 74 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 17, 19 (1992), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/92/05/Foreign_May_Jun1992.pdf.
101. Id. at 24–25.
102. See I.R.C. § 861 (2006) (providing the source rules relating to foreign income from
sources within the United States).
103. Id. § 882. Foreign corporations are taxed on income “effectively connected with a trade
or business within the United States.” Id. § 882(a)(1).
104. See United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, art. 5, 7(1)
(raising the threshold for business taxation to income derived from a permanent establishment
located within the United States).
105. I.R.C. § 882(a)(1).
106. Id. § 881(a).
107. See Barker, supra note 14, at 650.
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taxing jurisdiction must give relief to the U.S. taxpayer for foreign tax paid.108
The U.S. does this by allowing a tax credit against U.S. corporate taxes for
foreign income taxes.109 The amount of this credit is limited by the U.S. tax
that is paid on foreign income.110 Hence, the location or territory where the
income is earned or sourced is a critical factor in determining the tax actually
paid to the U.S.111
The second aspect of worldwide U.S. taxation of U.S. corporations is the
definition of a U.S. corporation. Only corporations incorporated in the United
States are U.S. corporations.112 U.S.-owned foreign corporations are not taxed
directly on their income; any tax is deferred until the profits are repatriated to
the U.S. corporation.113 The U.S. corporation is entitled to an indirect credit
for foreign dividends with regard to the foreign tax on the foreign earnings of
the U.S.-owned affiliate.114 Thus, the combination of the direct taxation of
worldwide income of U.S. corporations and deferred, indirect taxation of
foreign corporate income creates a powerful incentive for new enterprises to
incorporate their parent corporations outside the United States in low-taxed
foreign jurisdictions.
The present system of worldwide taxation—with deferral for active business
income earned by foreign corporations coupled with the application of the
foreign tax credit for repatriated earnings—requires the proper determination
of the source of income and the proper allocation of deductions between
domestic and foreign sources.115 Territorial taxation of foreign enterprises by
the United States must also confront the similar challenge of locating the site
of income and deductions for allocation to the U.S. tax base.116 The lack of an
economic basis or any consensus on appropriate rules of sourcing and
allocation is well known117 and results in distortions in income and expense
classification, which are magnified by the shifting of income and deductions
through pricing and debt planning.118 Consequently, legislators have been
108. I.R.C. § 901(a).
109. Id. § 904 (foreign tax credit limitation).
110. Id.
111. See Barker, supra note 14, at 650–51.
112. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3)–(5) (defining a domestic and foreign corporation).
113. See Barker, supra note 14, at 651 & n.23.
114. I.R.C. § 902.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 108–14.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 102–06.
117. See, e.g., Barker, supra note 17, at 202–12 (analyzing a variety of international source
rules and their respective flaws); Fred B. Brown, An Equity-Based, Multilateral Approach for
Sourcing Income Among Nations, 11 FLA. TAX. REV. 565, 629 (2011) (stressing the necessity for
international agreement); Stephen E. Shay et al., The David R. Tillinghast Lecture “What’s
Source Got to Do With It?” Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81,
137–38 (2002) (examining the inherent difficulties of allocating individual gains based on the
underlying net income concept of U.S. federal income tax laws).
118. See Barker, supra note 14, at 674; see also supra Part I.A.
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active in enacting complex anti-avoidance rules to mitigate the abuses.119
However, as shown in Table I, the combination of debt financing and tax
incentives results in a negative corporate income tax on the debt-financed
activities of U.S. corporations.120
Due to the prevalence of debt financing of foreign-owned corporations doing
business in the United States, the U.S. corporate income tax is quite
ineffectual.121 As demonstrated in Part I.A, corporations can easily replace
equity capital with debt capital, thereby removing would-be profits from the
tax base.122 The problem of debt financing is further exacerbated in the case
where the creditor of the foreign-owned U.S. enterprise is a related party,
This
which may result in excessive deductible interest payments.123
practice—the overuse of debt and charging interest that represent a rate greater
than a market return on debt capital—is called “earnings stripping.”124 In the
United States, which provides for transfer pricing rules and regulations on debt
characterization, Congress has tried to curb the abuse through legislation.125
Generally, however, only a fundamental change in the way the United States
taxes foreign-owned enterprises would cure this problem.126
Although the United States has taken aggressive measures toward foreign
operations of U.S. corporations, it hardly seems worth the effort. The United
States collects little revenue from the foreign business of U.S. corporations.127
The nation stands alone today as the only country in the world that attempts to
tax the worldwide business income of its resident corporations.128 Among the
proposals for international tax reform,129 many governments have moved to

119. I.R.C. § 482 (2006) (permitting the adjustment of income calculations to prevent tax
evasion); id. § 951(a) (taxing U.S. shareholders on certain income from their controlled foreign
corporations in order to prevent erosion of the U.S. tax base); Barker, supra note 14, at 674
(noting the substantial compliance cost of anti-avoidance rules).
120. Supra TABLE I (U.S. corporations pay negative 46% on debt-financed investment).
121. See Culbertson & King, supra note 60, at 1161–62.
122. See id. at 1161–66; see also supra Part I.A.
123. See Culbertson & King, supra note 60, at 1162; see also supra note 46 and
accompanying text (explaining that interest on corporate debt is deductible).
124. See Culbertson & King, supra note 60, at 1161–66 (describing the practice known as
earnings stripping in detail).
125. I.R.C. § 163(j) (2006) (limiting interest deductions if a corporation has excess interest
and a debt-to-equity ratio that exceeds 1.5 to 1); id. § 267(b) (defining related entities for
purposes of § 163(j)); see also Culbertson & King, supra note 60, at 1166–69 (describing the
interplay between these and other relevant statutes).
126. See generally William B. Barker, An International Tax System for Emerging Economies,
Tax Sparing and Development: It Is All About Source!, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L. L. 349 (2007)
(providing such a proposal).
127. See supra note 56.
128. See Barker, supra note 14, at 647, 650–51, 682 (explaining that the United States is
unique in its approach to taxing a corporation based on its worldwide income).
129. See id. at 647–87 (discussing the various reform proposals and their drawbacks).
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comprehensive corporate income taxation with the exemption of active foreign
business income.130
To date, lawmakers in the United States do not appear interested in such a
change, nor should it be recommended. Studies have shown that this “new”
regime of territorial income taxation, known as exemption systems, is subject
to the same compliance costs, difficulties, and abuses as the present U.S.
system.131 Exemption of foreign business income also raises the same
sourcing, allocation, and characterization problems that deferral does.132
II. THE ELEMENTS OF A CASH FLOW TAX ON CORPORATIONS
The suggestion of a cash flow tax as the solution to tax reform is not
novel.133 Previous proposals have primarily focused, however, on the desire to
replace the income tax with a consumption tax for all taxpayers.134 This
article’s contribution is quite different; it suggests only a reform of the
corporate income tax, which is accomplished by implementing a cash flow tax
solely for corporations and other large businesses.135 It also rejects the
longstanding view that countries should adopt an origin-based cash flow tax136
and instead proposes a destination-based cash flow tax. This dramatically
different conclusion results from approaching the problems of effective
taxation of corporate income from an international perspective. It unifies
corporate tax under one principle: all corporations, whether foreign or
domestic, without thresholds or exceptions, are subject to a
destination-based cash flow tax.137
130. Id. at 682.
131. Id. at 682–86.
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 4–8 and accompanying text.
135. This proposal was first illuminated in a prior work by this author and was meant to
respond to an article by Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah in which Prof. Avi-Yonah suggested the
merits of a territorial cash flow tax on corporations. See William B. Barker, Tax Reform in the
(Inter)National Interest: Why Wait?, 124 TAX NOTES 828, 828 (2009). In April 2010, this same
author delivered a paper on this same topic at Northwestern University School of Law’s
Symposium on International Tax Reform in a Reset Economy, which was published in the 2010
summer issue of the Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business. See Barker, supra
note 14. In that paper, the author further refined his recommendations by proposing the adoption
of a destination-based, territorial consumption tax for all corporations. Id. at 687–97. In
December 2010, Professor Alan J. Auerbach, in a paper released jointly by the Center for
American Progress and The Hamilton Project, also proposed the adoption of a destination-based
cash flow tax for corporations. See Auerbach, supra note 58, at 10.
136. This was the proposal of both THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 229–30, and HALL
& RABUSHKA, supra note 5, at 60–61.
137. Unlike many of the previous works on comprehensive consumption taxes, the proposal
that the United States should adopt a destination-based cash flow tax for all corporations is the
outgrowth of considerations of international taxation reform. Early research demonstrated that
the principle problem with international taxation was its lack of an economic basis for the source
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A. The Basics of Cash Flow Taxes
Taxation under a cash flow tax does exactly what its name suggests; it taxes
the net positive cash flow of a business.138 The basic form includes the value
of all receipts in income and allows a deduction for all payments.139 The
essential difference between a cash flow tax and an income tax is the treatment
of capital expenditures.140 Whereas a cash flow tax provides for the immediate
deduction of all capital expenditures, an ideal income tax denies the immediate
deduction of capital expenditures, requiring instead that the taxpayer deduct
those expenditures over the useful life of the asset through depreciation.141
However, the practical consequences are more complex.
The general rule under the American income tax system is that expenditures
for tangible assets with a useful life of more than one year are capitalized.142 It
rules for foreign and domestic income. The application of cash flow tax concepts results in a
practical, fair, and economically sound allocation of income and expenses between resident
countries taxing on a worldwide basis and host countries taxing on a territorial basis. The basic
premise is that a cash flow tax captures the value that is attributable to the location in which the
business is conducted. It provides a fair allocation of non-capital business income among nations,
while capital income is fairly allocated exclusively to the nation where that capital was produced
or derived, which is the state of the taxpayer’s residence. See Barker, supra note 126, at 374–75
(advocating that the revenue produced by multinational corporations should be taxed by the
countries in which they operate).
These insights led to the conclusion that an effective and fair base for source taxation of business
profits is domestic economic rents. This left the tax on the normal return from capital from
foreign activities to the nation of the taxpayer’s residence. The most practical method to
implement such a system was to use a cash flow expenditure tax. See id. at 380 (arguing for rent
taxation systems in developing nations).
Later research expanded upon this analysis and concluded that a cash flow tax system should be
applied to all corporations in the United States, both foreign and domestic. This recommendation
proceeded from two interdependent factors.
The first was the understanding that resident states face many of the same practical problems of
effective corporate taxation that source states do. See Barker, supra note 14, at 682–86. Second,
the free movement of many of the factors of production, specifically capital and technology, has
led to increasing tax competition. See Barker, supra note 17, at 721–22. Even developed
nations’ resident tax systems are strained by transfer pricing issues, debt equity issues, and
foreign income deferral. Both the economic and the tax bases of many nations are at risk. This
leads to the practical solution to abandon the corporate tax on capital income, while leaving intact
taxation of an individual’s capital income and progressive income tax principles. In general, a tax
on business income without a tax on capital income can be implemented best by a cash flow tax.
See Barker, supra note 126, at 381–82.
138. See BASIC TAX REFORM, supra note 2, at 2, 9.
139. See How Much Capital Taxed, supra note 4, at 1. A cash flow tax would continue the
income tax rule that individual gifts are not deductible. See I.R.C. § 274(b) (2006). There is no
technical reason for why the deduction for charitable contributions could not be continued. See
id. § 170.
140. See How Much Capital Taxed, supra note 4, at 1.
141. Id.; see also BASIC TAX REFORM, supra note 2, at 44 (discussing the inherent
difficulties in determining the depreciation of an asset in an income tax system).
142. I.R.C. § 263A(a).
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is this cost or basis that is recovered, ideally, through depreciation over the
economic useful life of an asset.143 The U.S. tax system provides several
mechanisms to accelerate these deductions, permitting the taxpayer to recover
costs more quickly.144 Similarly, in the case of intangible assets, the basic
structure of capitalization and depreciation is applied by statute and
regulation.145 American tax law, however, is riddled with exceptions.146 Many
intangibles, like going concern value or goodwill, are a byproduct of otherwise
deductible expenditures like wages, and therefore are not capitalized and
depreciated.147 The statutory scheme of capitalization and amortization is
primarily a factor only when intangibles are acquired through direct
purchase.148 Finally, the cost of some assets, like land, cannot be depreciated
either because they are not consumed in creating income or because they lack a
fixed, determinable useful life required for depreciation under an income tax
system.149 Their costs can only be recovered upon sale or other disposition of
the asset.150
Most studies performed by economists compare an ideal income tax that
permits only economic depreciation with a consumption tax that permits the
deduction of all profit-making expenditures, including wages.151 The present
U.S. income tax system permits first-year deductions or credits for many
expenditures that create value beyond the end of the taxable year, including
advertising and research and development, and allows deductions or greatly
accelerated depreciation for other capital expenditures—thus making the
present system a hybrid income/consumption tax system.152 Therefore,
comparing idealized forms overstates the advantage to taxpayers and the loss
143. See BASIC TAX REFORM, supra note 2, at 44 (stating that, conversely, the tax base is
eroded when depreciation rules are inconsistent with the actual depreciation of an asset).
144. I.R.C. § 168 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (permitting an accelerated cost recovery system).
145. See I.R.C. § 197 (allowing for straight line depreciation, or amortization, of intangible
assets); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)–4(f) (2004) (providing the general rule for capitalization).
146. Research and development activities that can produce considerable future value are
generally deductible by statute. See I.R.C. § 174(a) (granting the taxpayer an election to deduct
research and experimental expenditures). Advertising, which creates value over more than one
year, is deductible. See Don Fullerton & Andrew B. Lyon, Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital,
in 2 TAX POLICY & THE ECONOMY 63, 66 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1988).
147. The test for capitalization is very broad. Expenditures that create significant future
benefits must be capitalized. See Indopco, Inc. v. C.I.R., 503 U.S. 79, 88–89 (1992).
148. See I.R.C. § 197(d) (providing examples of intangible assets subject to amortization);
see also Amy J. Bokinsky, Note, Section 197: Taxpayer Relief and Questions of Asymmetry, 14
VA. TAX REV. 211, 236 (1994) (“To amortize an intangible asset, it must have been purchased in
a taxable transaction.”).
149. I.R.C. § 167.
150. Id. § 1001.
151. See, e.g., BASIC TAX REFORM, supra note 2, at 44 (comparing depreciation in an income
tax model with depreciation in a cash flow tax model).
152. Roger Gordon et al., Do We Now Collect Any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?, 88
J. PUB. ECON. 981, 1000–01 (2004).
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of revenue to the government of consumption taxes.153 It should not be
surprising that one recent study concluded that overall revenue would not
significantly decrease were the corporate tax system changed from income to
cash flow.154 Thus, our present hybrid income/consumption tax system
attempts to reach certain consumption tax results without the practical benefit
of a consistent consumption tax approach.155
In comparison, a cash flow tax measures what is available for consumption
after accounting for all expenditures.156 Consequently, all expenditures for
assets that are normally capitalized under an income tax system are simply
deducted.157 The treatment of financial assets under a cash flow tax depends
on the type of cash flow system adopted.158
The value of a cash flow tax to the taxpayer is that the immediate deduction
of all expenditures does not tax the normal return on capital, whether in the
form of debt or equity.159 However, a cash flow tax does tax the supernormal
returns to capital, which are referred to as economic rents.160 A corporate
income tax, in an asymmetrical fashion, taxes the normal return on equity, but
does not tax the normal return on debt.161 It does this by allowing a deduction
for interest but not for dividends.162
If an individual earns all returns on debt or equity capital directly, there
would be no distinction between debt and equity under a comprehensive
income tax system.163 Basic investment of either debt or equity would be tax
neutral, as would capital recovery of any sort.164 The return on capital,
whether the profits on capital take the form of a return on equity or interest on
debt, would be included.165

153. See, e.g., Fullerton & Lyon, supra note 146, at 63–64 (finding that untaxed intangible
capital reduces overall efficiency in the current tax structure).
154. See Gordon et al., supra note 152, at 987–89.
155. Id. at 1000–01 (explaining that the U.S. system “has long been recognized as a hybrid of
an income and consumption tax, with elements that do not fit naturally into either pure system”).
156. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
157. See id.; see also supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.
158. See infra Part II.C (discussing the differences between R and R&F-type cash flows).
159. See Barker, supra note 14, at 689; see also infra Part III.
160. See Noël B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base,
52 TAX L. REV. 17, 23–24 (1996); David Elkins & Christopher Hanna, Taxation of Supernormal
Returns, 62 TAX LAW. 93, 100 (2009).
161. See Barker, supra note 14, 689.
162. Id.
163. See Cunningham, supra note 160, at 23–24; see also Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity
Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1058–65 (2000) (describing the
current U.S. debt-equity distinction in tax treatment).
164. See Pratt, supra note 163, at 1058–65.
165. Id.
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The incidence of corporate tax, however, adds a new perspective on the tax
treatment of different forms of investment capital.166 Debt is subject to one
layer of tax, whereas equity is subject to two.167 Thus, in the context of
individual taxpayers, the distinction between debt and equity is mostly about
assigning priorities among the business owners and creditors.168
Corporate form changes everything because the true owner of equity capital
is not the corporation. Where investment is made in corporate form, the
incidence of a separate corporate tax within an income tax system treats such
investment in dramatically different ways depending on its classification as
debt or equity.169 Classic taxation imposes tax at the investor level equally on
interest or dividends.170 Interest expense is deductible by the corporation;
however, dividend payments are not deductible by the corporation.171 This
results in one level of tax being imposed solely on the creditor for the return on
debt capital.172 The return on equity capital is taxed twice.173
The following table illustrates this distinction. Compare an equal investment
of debt and equity under both the classical system and the present modified
system.174 Assume a 34% corporate tax rate, a 35% individual tax rate, and a
special rate of 15% on corporate dividends.

166. See supra Part I.A (discussing debt and equity in the corporate setting).
167. See Pratt, supra note 163, at 1064; see also supra Part I.A.
168. See supra Part I.A. Whether we consider the principle amount of a loan or the
commitment of equity capital, the flow to and from a business is tax neutral. As to the return on
capital, interest is deductible by the business, thus ensuring that the portion of the profits paid as
interest is taxed once to the owner of that stream of income. The return on equity capital is not
deductible to ensure that the owner of that capital is assessed tax on the return from that capital.
169. See infra TABLE II.
170. Under present law, dividends are taxed at a maximum rate of 15%, which is the standard
tax rate on long-term capital gains. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006); see also supra text accompanying
note 69.
171. See Pratt, supra note 163, at 1058–65.
172. See infra TABLE II.
173. It is first taxed to the corporation, and—when profits are distributed out of the
corporation’s after-tax income—the returns are taxed a second time to the shareholders.
174. See infra TABLE II.
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Invest
Profit
Corp. Tax 34%
Distribution
Tax at 35%
Tax at 15%
After Tax Return

Debt
1000
100
0
100
35
65

TABLE II
Equity (at 35%)
1000
100
34
66
23.10
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Equity (Div 15%)
1000
100
34
66

42.90

9.9
56.1

In order for the taxpayer to receive the same after-tax return on equity as on
debt, the corporate profit on equity financing in the case of the present split
rate (15%) system would have to be $115.86 instead of $100.00.175 In the
classical system, with the full taxation of dividend income and the taxpayer
being in the highest tax bracket (34%), the before-tax corporate income would
have to be $129.97.176
B. Origin v. Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxes
There are two different systems for defining the tax base of a cash flow tax:
the destination principle and the origin principle.177 Both are territorial tax
systems and, like all cash flow taxes, both do not tax the normal return from
capital—they only tax the economic rents earned by a corporation.178
Origin and destination-based cash flow taxes differ in how they determine
inclusions and exclusions from the tax base. The tax base under an origin
principle identifies the value created by a nation after subtracting the normal
cost of capital.179 The first component is the total income from the sale of
goods and services sold in a country, whether produced domestically or
imported.180 The second component is the deduction of the total cost
associated with those goods and services, whether produced domestically or
imported.181 The result is that an origin-based cash flow tax reaches only
domestic production.182
The tax base under a destination principle identifies the value consumed by a
nation after excluding the normal cost of capital.183 The first component is the
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

The formula is 65 = X - .34X - 15(X - .34X).
The formula is 65 = X - .34X - .35(X - .34X).
See Barker, supra note 14, at 690.
Id. at 690–96; see also infra Part III.
See Barker, supra note 90, at 690.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 692–93.
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total income from the sale of all goods and services destined for the home
market, which excludes all sales of exported goods and services.184 The
second component is the deduction of the cost of all goods and services
produced in the country, which does not allow for a deduction of imports.185
The destination principle’s opposite treatment of exports and imports results in
a tax on production consumed in the home market irrespective of where it was
produced.186 Whereas the origin principle taxes domestic production, the
destination principle taxes domestic consumption.187
Thus, when seeking to establish a cash flow tax base, the choice is between a
tax on domestic production or on domestic consumption. The origin-based
approach taxes on the basis of what a nation adds to the store of
consumables.188 Its territorial form relinquishes the right to foreign-produced
economic rents consumed within the United States, while gaining the right to
U.S.-produced economic rents consumed outside the United States.189
The destination-based approach taxes on the basis of what a nation removes
from the store of consumables.190 In contrast to the origin principle, its
territorial form relinquishes the right to domestic-produced economic rents
consumed outside the United States while gaining the right to
foreign-produced economic rents consumed inside the United States.191
Both an origin-based and destination-based cash flow tax offer a nation a
legitimate tax base well within the general sovereignty of each nation. From a
philosophical perspective, both systems reach consumption. The only issue,
however, is whose consumption is taxed: that of Americans only or that of all
Purely practical
persons consuming American goods and services.192
considerations dictate that in a globalized world where many of the factors of
production are mobile and where, consequently, other nations will compete for
business with tax incentives, only a destination-based cash flow tax will yield a
largely unavoidable corporate tax.193

184. Id. at 692–94.
185. Id. at 693.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 690–91; see also supra note 160 and accompanying text (describing economic
rents).
190. Barker, supra note 14, at 692–93. Taxation under the destination principle is more
consistent with general consumption tax philosophy. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 158
(George Rutledge & Sons, 3d ed. 1887) (setting forth the classical justification for consumption
taxes: taxing on what one removes from society rather than taxing on what one produces or
contributes to society). Although this justification makes sense for individuals, it is not
persuasive when applied to corporations as they do not directly consume.
191. See Barker, supra note 14, at 693.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 694–95.
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Because an origin-based approach taxes exports and allows deductions for
imports, it provides a tax incentive for locating production outside the home
country and provides a strong incentive for transfer pricing abuse.194 Thus, an
origin-based tax distorts economic decision-making in an open economy where
many of the factors of production are mobile and corporations are free to locate
their activities outside the United States.195 A destination principle eliminates
exports and imports from the tax base, thus its subject matter—domestic sales
and domestic production—is much more easily monitored by the taxing
jurisdiction.196 Therefore, a destination-based cash flow tax does not distort
economic decision-making and renders the tax largely unavoidable, even in the
real world of open economies.197 Consequently, the destination principle
eliminates much of the benefit of non-arm’s-length transfer pricing, which
remains an important loophole in both income taxes and origin-based
cash flow taxes.198 Although similar to a destination-based value added tax
(VAT) imposed only on corporations, the destination-based cash flow tax
diverges from the VAT in that it allows a deduction for wages paid for services
performed in the United States.199 Thus, unlike a VAT, a destination-based
cash flow tax is not a tax on labor; it is a tax on economic rents closely
associated with a particular nation through its peoples’ consumption.200
C. Two Methods for Measuring Cash Flow: The R-Type and the R&F-Type
Cash Flow Tax
There are two general models that can be used for measuring cash flow.
Each starts with a comprehensive income tax base and allows an immediate
deduction for materials, labor, and fixed assets.201 The basic model, the
R-type, ignores all financial transactions, with dividends and interest neither

194. See id. at 691 (describing transfer pricing abuse when multinational businesses
artificially inflate the cost of imports or deflate the cost of exports to respectively increase
deductions or decrease taxable income).
195. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 839, 883–84 (noting that an
origin-based cash flow tax is nondistortionary only in a closed economy); see also Barker, supra
note 126, at 351–52.
196. See Barker, supra note 14, at 695 (noting that “problems of avoidance under a
destination expenditure tax are substantially eliminated,” while incentives to mischaracterize
domestic sales as exports and imports as domestic production will remain).
197. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 839, 883–84; see also Barker, supra note 14, at
695.
198. See supra notes 121–26, 194–97.
199. See Auerbach et al, supra note 57, at 839, 883–84.
200. Id. at 884–85.
201. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 230–33; see also Barker, supra note 14, at
689.
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taxed when received nor deductible when paid.202 Both payments and
repayments of equity capital and debt principal are tax-neutral.203
A second design, the R&F-type, changes the treatment of all financial
instruments. On the one hand, all amounts received as interest, dividends, the
principal amount of the debt, and the initial equity investment are included in
the tax base.204 On the other hand, payments of interest, dividends, and the
principal amount of debt and equity investments are deducted.205 The
R&F-type takes into account all cash flows, both real and financial.206 The
R-type takes into account only real cash flows from business operations.207
Because the sole difference between the models is the treatment of financial
transactions, the R-type is often recommended for active business enterprises
on account of its perceived simplicity.208 The R-type is not recommended for
financial service enterprises because its application would exempt most profit,
as the R-type exempts net interest income.209 An R&F-type, however, includes
all capital flows, which includes net interest. Where a corporation’s primary
business is providing credit and other financial services, the R-type method
would fail to capture the true profit of the firm.210
Financial service businesses are similar to other businesses because they also
provide services and products.211 Their product, so to speak, is credit. Their
services include various items that facilitate the flow of money and capital.
Much of a financial service business’s gross income is in the form of interest
and not payments for specific services, even where a substantial portion of the
charge is for services.212 Were banks to charge fairly and separately for all
services, the exemption of interest income and interest expense under an
R-type system would make less difference. Interest paid to bank depositors
202. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 230–33; see also Barker, supra note 14, at
689.
203. See Barker, supra note 14, at 689.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 233.
207. See id. at 230.
208. See id. at 239. Because neither profits nor losses are part of the system, a yield exempt
or R system is thought to be the economic equivalent of an R&F or pure cash flow system
because both exempt the normal return from capital but not the risk premium. A yield exempt
does differ from the pure cash flow in exempting economic rents whereas cash flow does not.
See How Much Capital Taxed, supra note 4, at 14. Because financial transactions under the
R-type are ignored, no accounting for them need be made. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note
2, at 240. In contrast, every part of financial transactions is included under an R&F system. See
Barker, supra note 14, at 689.
209. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 236, 240; see also Barker, supra note 14, at
695.
210. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 236, 240; see also Barker, supra note 14, at
695.
211. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 236.
212. See id.
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would be higher where all services provided to depositors were separately
charged, and interest charged to borrowers would be lower because some of
the value provided to borrowers would be re-characterized as service
income.213 As a result, financial service providers would start to resemble
business enterprises that tend to be net debtors with financial costs exceeding
financial gains.214 As long as this is the case, an R-type system captures the
true profits or economic rents of the corporate enterprise.215 However, where
any corporation earns net financial profits, the only way to capture these true
profits or economic rents is by including interest and all other capital flows in
the tax base under an R&F-type cash flow tax.216
Application of the R&F-type method to corporations should not be lightly
abandoned because of its perceived complexity. Applied to relatively
sophisticated corporations, the R&F-type is straightforward; some suggest the
R&F-type system is only slightly more technically difficult than an R-type and
is conceptually simpler because it treats all receipts and expenditures the
same.217 There would be no reason to characterize different receipts or
expenditures as real or financial because they would all be fully included in the
tax base.218 Corporations are sufficiently sophisticated to apply the R&F-type,
which merely requires accounting for all capital flows.219 Indeed, taxation
should be much simpler when compared to the current corporate income tax.
The perception that the R&F-type is more complex can be the result of
viewing it from the income tax perspective. An R&F-type radically changes
the way capital is treated in that the principal amount of loans and equity
capital are added to income when received.220 Similarly, deducting the
repayment of loans, equity capital, dividends, and interest is equally strange
from an income tax perspective.221 The R-type, however, also contains
elements foreign to an income tax, such as the exclusion of interest and
dividends from income and the inability to deduct interest.222 This has led to
the suggestion that an R&F-type should be adopted for non-financial
213. See Bank of Am. v. United States, 680 F.2d 142, 143–45 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (providing an
example of the difficulty in distinguishing between interest and other financial service income in
the international context); see also THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 231–32.
214. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 230–32. It is more likely in the case of
non-financial business enterprises that the returns from financial capital would take the form of
business profits, which are fully included in income in an R-type tax. See id. at 230.
215. See id.
216. See Barker, supra note 14, at 689.
217. See id.; see also supra note 208 and accompanying text.
218. See Barker, supra note 14, at 689. A cash flow tax would undoubtedly continue the
income tax’s prohibition of deducting gifts over $25. See I.R.C. § 274(b) (2006). However, it
may also continue the deductibility of charitable contributions. Id. § 170.
219. See Barker, supra note 14, at 689.
220. Compare Barker, supra note 14, at 689, with Pratt, supra note 163, at 1054–64.
221. See Barker, supra note 14, at 689.
222. See id.
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enterprises only for debt,223 solely on the basis that it would aid the transition
from an income tax that allows the deduction of interest to an R-type that does
not.224
The adoption of such a hybrid R/R&F-type would be a mistake. The hybrid
R/R&F-type perpetuates the distinctions between debt and equity, whereas the
R-type ignores them and the R&F-type eliminates them.225 Only applying cash
flow principles to debt but not to equity capital would make the system
dependent on the problems of debt-equity characterization that plague the
income tax.226 The history of the income tax demonstrates the ambiguity
inherent in such classifications; courts and administrators have always
struggled with classification regimes and their application.227 Because debt
and equity are both forms of capital investment, the exaggerated difference in
A hybrid
tax regimes provides large incentives for manipulation.228
R/R&F-type would put a premium on careful planning to take advantage of
cash flow principles for debt and exemption principles for equity.229
The adoption of the basic R-type would similarly be a mistake, as it also
creates opportunities for tax avoidance. The R-type creates critical distinctions
in classifications by excluding financial transactions from cash flow.230 These
distinctions are not between debt and equity but between operating income and
expense, and financial income and expense.231 The R-type advantages
financial income, which is exempt, and operating expenses, which are
deductible.232 This allows the opportunity to take advantage of these
asymmetries when tax planning.233
Thus, a hybrid R/R&F-type perpetuates the income distinctions between
debt and equity234 and the R-type creates a new distinction between financial
and non-financial transactions.235 Both types would perpetuate important
223. See Altshuler & Grubert, supra note 56, at 795.
224. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 233; see also Altshuler & Grubert, supra note
56, at 795.
225. See Barker, supra note 14, at 689.
226. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 60, ch. 4 (providing detail on these existing
problems); see generally Pratt, supra note 163.
227. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 60, ch. 1.01; see also Pratt, supra note 163, at
1065–72 (detailing the history of corporate income tax and the debt-equity distinction).
228. See Culbertson & King, supra note 60, at 1161–62.
229. See supra Part I.A. For example, where interest expenditures exceed interest income,
the ideal plan would be the utilization of debt, which would yield a net deduction. Where interest
income exceeds interest expense, the ideal form would be equity since the net equity income
would be exempt.
230. See David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV. 599, 624 (2000).
231. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 230–32.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See supra notes 220–29 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 230–33 and accompanying text.
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defects in the present corporate income tax system. These problems evaporate
with the R&F-type cash flow tax, which does not differentiate between debt
and equity nor between financial and non-financial transactions.236
Consequently, characterization of receipts or expenditures is irrelevant,
removing the central element of most tax arbitrage schemes. The adoption of
the R&F-type furthers the objective of creating a largely unavoidable corporate
tax.237
Applying this concept internationally, U.S. corporations could continue to
conduct their foreign operations under separate corporations.238 Conversely,
foreign-owned corporations could continue to conduct their U.S. activities in
separate corporations subject to a destination-based cash flow tax.239 Incoming
loans, capital from shareholders, dividends, and interest would be included in
the tax base whether the source was domestic or foreign.240 Similarly,
outgoing loans, equity payments to shareholders, dividends, and interest would
be deducted from the tax base whether the source was domestic or foreign.241
Further, foreign borrowing should not be excluded from the tax base despite
suggestions to the contrary.242 First, the system would be simpler if no
distinction were made between U.S. and foreign loans. If a corporation desired
to keep its foreign financial activities separate, it could place these activities in
a foreign corporation.243 Second, for U.S. operations, the change with foreign
borrowing does little substantively because full inclusion or full exclusion are
essentially economic equivalents for loans.244 But were the tax law to
distinguish between both the source and the destination of funds as relevant to
inclusion or exclusion, complex tracing and accounting would be required.245
Finally, fully including loans regardless of their source or destination does not
result in any benefit to the taxpayer because the loans would be fully subject to
the cash flow principle.246 As demonstrated in the tables below, only the
236. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 233; see also Barker, supra note 14, at 689.
237. See supra Part I.A (discussing avoidance measures under the current corporate tax
regime).
238. See Barker, supra note 14, at 692–95 (discussing the merits of a destination-based
R&F-type tax).
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 887–88 (suggesting that foreign borrowing under
a destination-based R&F-type tax would not generate taxable income).
243. See Barker, supra note 14, at 693 (“The destination principle exempts the economic
rents that are consumed elsewhere.”).
244. This holds true where the interest rate is a market rate because, by definition, a market
rate represents the normal return on capital, which is tax-exempt under a yield exempt tax and a
cash flow tax. See discussion infra Part III.
245. The loan would be taxed when received and deducted when paid. See Barker, supra
note 14, at 689; see also infra TABLE III.
246. See infra TABLE III.
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destination of the expenditures is relevant to a destination-based cash flow tax
because intragroup cash flows are ignored and only domestic expenditures are
deducted.
TABLE III
Inclusion of Foreign Financial Transactions
Source of Loan

Destination of Proceeds

U.S. Lender:
Receipt principal and interest included
Repayment with interest deducted

U.S. Production:
Expenditures deducted
Disposition of asset included

Same as

Or

Foreign Lender:
Receipt included
Repayment with interest deducted

Foreign Production:
Expenditure not deducted
Disposition not included

Exclusion of Foreign Loans
Source

Destination

U.S. Loans:
Receipt principal and interest included
Repayment with interest deducted

U.S. Production:
Receipt principal and interest included
Repayment with interest deducted

Different from

Different from

Foreign Loans:
Exclude receipts
No deduction for payments

Foreign Production:
Exclude receipts
No deduction for payments

D. A Comparison of Income and Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxes
The United States should replace the corporate income tax with an
R&F-type, destination-based cash flow tax. To illustrate the effects of this
proposal, the following tables illustrate the results of comparing an income tax
system and a destination-based cash flow corporate tax system. First, Table IV
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considers a U.S. or foreign corporation that imports goods and services for sale
in the United States. It is assumed that the foreign corporation meets the
threshold for U.S. taxation by meeting either the statutory test or the treaty
test.247
TABLE IV248
Comparison of Present U.S. Corporate Income Tax with R-Type
Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax
Inflow (Income)
Amount
Income Tax
Cash Flow
Gross income from sales, rents,
royalties, sales of business
10,000
10,000
10,000
assets (U.S. source)
Total Income
10,000
10,000
10,000
Outflow (N-Current Exp.)
Labor (U.S. only)
Imports (IMU purchase)
Capital Expenditures249
Total Expenses
Total Base

Amount
<1,000>
<4,000>
-<5,000>

Income Tax
<1,000>
<4,000>
-5,000

Cash Flow
<1,000>
--<9,000>
9,000

Table V represents a more complex example by showing a corporation doing
business in the United States and producing for domestic and foreign markets.
The table also assumes that most foreign activities are conducted through
corporations incorporated outside the United States.

247. I.R.C. § 882 (2006) (income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business); United
States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, arts. 5, 7(1) (income derived from a
permanent establishment in the United States). If the foreign corporation failed to meet this
threshold, it would not be subject to the territorial income tax regime of the United States with
respect to its business income. See supra text accompanying notes 91–93. The U.S. corporation
would be taxed nevertheless because it would be subject to worldwide taxation. See supra text
accompanying notes 91–93. The foreign corporation, however, would still be subject to a
destination-based cash flow tax even if it were not “doing business in the United States” as long
as it made sales within the United States. See Barker, supra note 14, at 692–93. Where a foreign
corporation imports products into the United States and sells them directly to retail outlets, under
a destination-based cash flow tax, one of two possibilities exist. Either the retail establishments
would not be entitled to a deduction for the cost of these goods, where the foreign corporation
was not taxable, or the foreign corporation would pay tax on these goods without deduction. For
the latter, the U.S. retailer would be entitled to a deduction. In either case, the full value (or cost)
of the imports would be taxed. See id. at 695–96.
248. To make the illustration simpler, TABLE IV adopts the R-type cash flow system, which
exempts or eliminates consideration of all capital flows, both debt and equity.
249. The assumption is that all capital expenditures are foreign and their cost is reflected in
the value of the imports.
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TABLE V
Comparison of Present U.S. Corporate Income Tax System with Simple R-Type
Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax on Corporations
R-Type Cash
Inflow (Income)
Amount
Income Tax
Flow
Gross income from sales, rents,
royalties, sales of business assets
U.S. consumption
Exported
Interest
TOTAL INCOME
Outflow (Expenses)
Labor:
U.S.
Foreign
Cost of Goods and Services
Interest (Domestic)
Dividends
Depreciation (U.S. & Foreign)
CURRENT EXPENSES
OUTFLOW
Capital Expenditures
Domestic source
Foreign source
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS
TOTAL BASE

20,000
4,000
100
24,100

20,000
4,000
100
24,100

20,000
0
0
20,000

Amount

Income Tax

Cash Flow

<5,000>
<2,000>
<4,000>
<500>
<500>
<750>

<5,000>
<2,000>
<4,000>
<500>
-<750>
<12,250>

<5,000>
-<4,000>
---<9,000>

5,000

9,000

--<12,250>
11,850

<2,000>
-<11,000>
9,000

<2,000>
<400>

Tax at 35%
Foreign Tax Credit
(35% net inc.)
TOTAL TAX

4,147.50
630.00

3,150
--

3,517.50

3,150

Table IV presents a simple case of an importer of goods that has very little
activity in the United States.250 Table V presents the more complex case of a
corporation that has both imports and exports.251 Interest expense has been
250. See supra TABLE IV.
251. See supra TABLE V.
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downplayed in these tables to focus attention on the role of imports, exports,
and capital expenditures. Under both systems, all costs of production within
the United States are deductible.252
The R&F-type adds the consequences of financial transactions to the
calculation of the tax base.253 Table VI illustrates the modifications that would
be made to Table V where the R&F-type cash flow tax is applied.254
TABLE VI
Modification of Table V Using R&F-Type Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax
Add to Inflows
Amount
Cash Flow (R&F)
Interest and Dividends
100
100
Debt Capital (Loans)
750
750
Equity Capital
100
100
Total Additions
New Subtotal
Current Deductions (No Change)
Add to Outflows
Loan Repayment Principal
Interest
Capital distributed
Dividends distributed
Additional Deductions
Total Tax Base (R&F)
TAX (35%)

950
20,950
<9,000>

<50>
<500>
0
<100>

<50>
<500>
0
<100>
<650>
11,300
3,955

These tables illustrate the difference in scope of a destination-based cash
flow tax. Because the tax base is domestic consumption, the tax base includes
only sales in the U.S., ignores foreign investment sales and expenditures, and
permits deductions for all U.S. produced goods and services, but not for
imports.255 It allows deductions even where the products or services produced
are exported because exports do not represent domestic consumption and
includes capital flows as they relate to domestic consumption.256 It taxes the
income from business operations.257 The consequence is that the R&F-type
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See supra TABLE V.
See supra notes 230–36 and accompanying text.
See supra TABLE V; see also infra TABLE VI.
See supra TABLES V–VI.
See supra TABLES V–VI.
See supra TABLES V–VI.
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cash flow tax excludes the normal returns from capital and captures the
supernormal returns from capital consumed in the United States no matter what
the original source.258
III. CASH FLOW TAXATION AND THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL INCOME
The essential difference in outcome between cash flow or consumption-style
taxes and income taxes is that cash flow taxes reduce the tax burden on
capital.259 The way cash flow taxes relieve the tax on capital depends on the
actual method chosen for measuring the tax base.260 When analyzing the
income generated by capital, it is helpful to start with the possibility that a
taxpayer may choose an investment with a practically certain return. This
return is known as the risk-free return on capital.261
The actual risk-free interest rate is known as the nominal rate.262 This can be
viewed as including both a real rate of return and an inflationary component.263
Where inflation exists, an investor must reduce the nominal rate by the rate of
inflation to determine the true profit.264 Historically, the real risk-free rate of
return has been less than 1%.265 The U.S. income tax system taxes nominal
interest.266 This includes a tax on the inflationary component of the return,
which is not a tax on real income.267 Taxing the inflationary component can
tax capital, which is not the purpose of an income tax.268
To illustrate, where a taxpayer loans $100.00 at a 4% nominal rate, after one
year the taxpayer has $100.00 of principal and $4.00 of interest pre-tax. The
after-tax result at a 35% tax rate is $102.60 ($100.00 principal and $4.00
interest minus tax of $1.40 (35% of $4.00)). Were the rate of inflation 3%, the
real, inflation-adjusted value of $100.00 at the end of one year is $103.00 and
the real rate of return would be .97%.269 Therefore, after taxes of $1.40, the
taxpayer has $102.60, which is a real loss in the value of his or her capital.
258. See supra TABLES V–VI.
259. See How Much Capital Taxed, supra note 4, at 1.
260. See generally id. (providing a comprehensive examination of the effect of cash flow
taxes on the taxation of capital and applying different economic assumptions).
261. See Cunningham, supra note 160, at 20–21. An investment in U.S. Treasury bills is the
paradigm for a risk-free return. See id. at 21 & n.23.
262. LAURENCE M. BALL, MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 77 (2d ed. 2012).
263. See id. (“The real interest rate is the nominal rate minus the inflation rate.”).
264. See id.
265. See BRADFORD, supra note 4, at 12; see also Bankman & Griffith, supra note 4, at
387–88.
266. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 4, at 391–92.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. This is calculated by dividing the interest of 1 by the inflation adjusted principal of 103.
The formula can be set out as follows: Nominal = ((1 + Real) / (1 + Inflation)) – 1. See
IBBOTSON SBBI 2009 CLASSIC YEARBOOK: MARKET RESULTS FOR STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS, AND
INFLATION 1926-2008, at 81 (2009).
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Not only has the income tax taken the taxpayer’s entire real return, it has
actually reduced the taxpayer’s capital. In terms of general income tax
principles, this makes no sense.270
Both R- and R&F-type cash flow taxes eliminate the tax on inflationary
gains from capital.271 With regard to financial instruments, an R-type cash
flow tax is a yield-exempt system for purposes of financial transactions.272 In
the example above, the $4.00 of interest would simply not be taxed with the
result that the taxpayer would have $104.00 after tax.273
The R&F-type cash flow tax also eliminates the tax on inflationary gains.274
In the example above, the taxpayer who has $100 to invest after taxes would
actually invest $153.85 before taxes.275 Because $153.85 would be deductible,
assuming a 35% tax rate, the taxpayer would receive a refund of $53.85,
making the out-of-pocket investment only $100.00. $153.85 at 4% would
yield $6.15 in one year. Assuming the taxpayer relinquished her investment at
the end of one year, he or she would be taxed on $160.00, which would include
the original investment of $153.85 plus interest of $6.15. A tax of 35% on
$160.00 would be $56.00, leaving $104.00 after taxes.
In the example above, regardless of the method utilized, the taxpayer would
be in the same post-tax position.276 The two methods exempt the entire
risk-free return on capital including the inflationary component of income.277
This distinguishes consumption-type taxes from income taxes that, in contrast,
do tax the risk-free return from capital.278
The different cash flow methods, however, do not always reach the same
result because their different methodologies can profoundly affect the actual
taxation of capital income.279 The R- and R&F-type are only economically
equivalent under certain assumptions: the ex ante perspective of the present
value of the expected return on the investment.280 One way to illustrate the
270. See Daniel Halperin & Eugene Steuerle, Indexing the Tax System for Inflation, in
UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME CONSUMPTION TAX 347, 348–53
(Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988) (arguing that inflation should not be taxed under an ideal
income tax).
271. See supra Part II.C.
272. See supra Part II.C.
273. See supra Part II.C.
274. See supra Part II.C.
275. The idea is to determine the amount a taxpayer would invest in order to have a net cost
after taxes of $100.00.
The formula for determining this amount is
(100) / (1-tax rate) = investment before taxes.
276. Assuming risk-free rate of return at 4%.
277. See Barker, supra note 17, at 213 (stating that interest and dividends are not taxed in
either an R- or R&F-type cash flow system).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 262–68.
279. See Barker, supra note 126, at 383 n.115 (citing THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at
230–33).
280. See Graetz, supra note 4, at 1602.
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difference between a pure cash flow (R&F-type) and a hybrid cash flow
(R-type) is to compare the treatment of a traditional Individual Retirement
Account (IRA) and a Roth Individual Retirement Account (Roth IRA).281 A
traditional IRA is a pure cash flow consumption tax under which all
investments are deductible and all withdrawals are income.282 A Roth IRA, on
the other hand, is a yield-exempt consumption tax, under which investments
are not deductible and withdrawals are not income.283 Traditional IRAs are
established with pre-tax contributions; Roth IRAs are established with post-tax
contributions.284 For instance, assume a taxpayer that has $100.00 to invest
pre-tax in an investment that is expected to return 10% in one year. Table VII
compares the results where the return is positive.285
TABLE VII
Comparison of Income Tax, Roth IRA, Traditional IRA
Income Tax
Roth IRA
Traditional IRA
Investment
70 (after 30% tax) 70 (after 30% tax)
100 (no tax)
Interest (10% per annum)
7
7
10
Total Before Tax
77
77
110
Tax
2.1
0
33
Total After Tax
74.9
77
77
Both IRAs are the economic equivalent even if the investments realized a
loss.286 Table VIII compares the results where the return on this investment is
negative.287

Investment
Interest/Loss
Total Before Tax
Tax
Total After Tax

TABLE VIII
Income Tax
Roth IRA
70 (after 30% tax)
70 (after 30% tax)
<35>
<35>
35
35
10.5 (refund)
-45.5
35

Traditional IRA
100 (no tax)
50
50
<15>
35

281. See I.R.C. § 408 (2006) (general provisions of IRAs); see also id. § 408A (general
provisions for Roth IRAs); id. § 219 (deductibility of contributions to traditional IRAs).
282. See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Lipstick, Light Beer, and Back-Loaded
Savings Accounts, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1101, 1110 (2006).
283. See id.
284. See id. at 1112.
285. See infra TABLE VII (showing a positive return from the initial investment regardless of
whether a Roth IRA or a traditional IRA is used).
286. See infra TABLE VIII.
287. See infra TABLE VIII.
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Tables VII and VIII illustrate a situation where the results under both Roth
and traditional IRAs are identical even where the actual results vary from the
expected results.288 This only holds true under certain assumptions and may
not be true in many cases.289 Both an income tax and a cash flow tax, like a
traditional IRA, tax actual results, not projected results because they are
post-paid taxes.290 In contrast, a yield-exempt consumption tax, like a Roth
IRA, taxes anticipated results because it is a pre-paid tax.291 In some cases,
there can be a considerable difference between expected results and actual
results. For example, were the tax rates to change from the time of the
investment to the time of withdrawal one year later, the effect on total return
would be quite different. Table IX illustrates this result.

Investment
Interest (10% per annum)
Total Before Tax
Tax (at 40%)
Total After Tax

TABLE IX
Income Tax
Roth IRA
70 (after 30% tax) 70 (after 30% tax)
7
7
77
77
2.8
0
74.2
77

Traditional IRA
100 (no tax)
10
110
44
66

Pre-paying the tax in contrast to post-paying the tax adds another dimension
of risk and return to the cash flow versus yield-exempt comparison when there
is a difference in the tax rate from the start of the investment to the end.292
The different timing of the methods can also dramatically change outcomes
depending on what the taxpayer does with the tax savings. Assume once again
that the taxpayer has $100.00 pre-tax to invest. Under a yield-exempt
approach, the taxpayer has only $70.00 to invest because the taxpayer pays
$30.00 in tax to the government.293 Under a cash flow tax approach, the
$100.00 available for investment is composed of $70.00 plus $30.00 in tax
savings, which are attributed to the deduction of the investment.294 As
demonstrated in Tables VIII and IX, cash flow and yield-exempt are equivalent
only where the tax savings available are invested at the same time and in an
288. See supra TABLES VII–VIII.
289. See Linda Sugin, Sustaining Progressivity in the Budget Process: Commentary on Gale
& Orszag’s An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the Bush Administration, 2001–2004, 45
B.C. L. REV. 1259, 1268 (2004).
290. Burke & McCouch, supra note 282, at 1112.
291. Id.
292. See supra TABLE IX.
293. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 282, at 1110, 1112; see also supra TABLES
VII–VIII.
294. See supra TABLES VII–VIII.
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investment with the same return, whether positive or negative.295 Assuming
the taxpayer was to invest the $30 in tax savings differently, the tax on capital
income would also be different.296
Because these tax savings are, in a sense, on temporary loan from the
government and must eventually be repaid, the taxpayer may choose a
different investment of the $30 in tax savings for several reasons. First,
taxpayers might be more risk adverse with what is owed in future taxes and
consciously choose a less risky investment with a smaller return. A second
possibility is that the savings might not be immediately available for taxpayers
to invest in the same investment because they will only receive those savings
from the government in the future as a tax refund. Borrowing the additional
$30 during the delay and incurring additional risk may not be financially wise
or acceptable to the taxpayer. A third possibility is that taxpayers might not
have sufficient income immediately available to provide a full tax offset from
the deduction, which could delay the tax refund.297 Under any of these
scenarios, the tax savings will likely be placed in a different investment at a
different time, where the risk and the rate of return may differ and the taxpayer
will have lost some of the time use of his or her money.
Table X illustrates simultaneous investments with two different positive
rates of return.298 Table XI illustrates what would occur in Table X if the
investment of the tax savings were delayed six months.299 Table XII assumes a
loss in the first investment and a positive return from the tax savings.300 In
each case, when the investment of the tax refund is delayed, the return for the
investment of the tax savings is reduced.301

Investment
Interest
Total Before Taxes
Subtotal
Tax
Total After Tax

TABLE X
Cash Flow
70
30
7 (10%)
1.50 (5%)
77
31.50
108.50
32.55
75.95

Exempt
70
7
77
77
0
77

295. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 282, at 1110; see also supra TABLES VII–VIII.
296. See infra TABLES X, XII (showing how the taxes vary when the taxpayer invests $30 of
tax savings differently than the initial $70).
297. See E. Cary Brown, Business Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME,
EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300, 301–06
(Lloyd A. Metzler et al. eds., 1948) (recognizing the importance of full-loss offsets).
298. See infra TABLE X.
299. See infra TABLE XI.
300. See infra TABLE XII.
301. See infra TABLES X–XII.
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TABLE XI
Cash Flow
Investment
Interest
Total Before Taxes
Subtotal
Tax
Total After Tax

Investment
Interest
Total Before Taxes
Subtotal
Tax
Total After Tax

70
7 (10%)
77

30
.75 (5%, ½ year)
30.75
107.75
32.32
75.43

TABLE XII
Cash Flow
70
30
<35>
1.50 (5% Int.)
35
31.50
66.50
19.95
46.55
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Exempt
70
7
77
77
0
77

Exempt
70
<35>
35
35
0
35

The key to these results is whether or not the tax is pre-paid or post-paid. A
tax can be said to be pre-paid because the taxpayer’s investment is out of
earnings available for present consumption. Because the investment is not
initially deducted, the consumption, even though it is postponed to the future,
is fully taxed. This is why, in Table VII, where the taxpayer earned $100.00,
he or she only had $70.00 (after a $30.00 tax) to invest.302 Although the
taxpayer has not yet consumed, the present value of the future consumption is
$100.00.303 The yield-exempt model operates prospectively by taxing future
consumption today at its present value.304 Because the government has fully
received its tax today on future consumption, it has no stake in the actual
outcome.305

302. See supra TABLE VII.
303. See James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1165 (2008) (noting that, under a pre-paid tax, return on investment is not
affected).
304. See id.
305. Cf. Cunningham, supra note 160, at 24. Under the pre-paid tax the government bears no
interest in the outcome, unlike under a post-paid tax where the government has a stake in the
return on a capital investment.
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The cash flow model, in contrast, operates retrospectively, waiting to tax
consumption when it occurs.306 Thus, the $100.00 invested is treated as
investment, not consumption, with its quality as future consumption ignored.307
Consequently, the $100.00 is excluded from the tax base under the cash flow
model.308 All receipts are included in the tax base, but will be offset by
deductions as long as they are invested and not consumed.309 Thus, a cash
flow tax is post-paid; it is paid when the taxpayer recovers capital and
profits.310 By deducting the investment when made, the cash flow tax
anticipates the entire loss of the taxpayer’s capital.311 If neither income nor
capital is returned, there will be no tax.312
In a cash flow tax, the government must wait for its tax.313 Because the tax
base in a cash flow tax excludes the original $100.00, one way of looking at it
is that the government refunds its tax of $30.00, thus making the government,
in a sense, a silent partner with the taxpayer.314 The government puts its
deferred tax revenue at the taxpayer’s disposal.315 The tax savings are only
temporarily on loan from the government, which shares in the profits and
losses of the taxpayer’s investment.316 The government, unlike the case of a
yield-exempt pre-paid approach, is a stakeholder.317
The analogy to a partnership between the taxpayer and government is not
perfect. The government is not an active partner because the taxpayer controls
the investment of the government’s tax money without the government’s
input.318 Where the taxpayer puts the government’s tax money ($30.00) in the
same investment as the taxpayer’s money ($70.00), then the government bears
all of the risks and benefits of its investment of $30.00 in the original
investment, and the taxpayer bears all of the risks and benefits of her
investment of $70.00. That is why yield-exempt and cash flow methods
produce the same results in Tables VII and VIII.319 However, under a cash
flow tax where the taxpayer invests the tax savings in a different investment,
306. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 1116; see also David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of
Risk, 58 TAX L. REV. 1, 21 (2004).
307. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 1116; see also Weisbach, supra note 306, at 21–22.
308. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 1116.
309. See id. at 1116, 1179. TABLE VII demonstrates this outcome: the taxpayer reports the
full amount of the retuned investment of $100.00 plus the $10.00 of income earned. See supra
TABLE VII.
310. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 282, at 1112.
311. See Cunningham, supra note 160, at 25.
312. See id.
313. See id. at 24.
314. See id. at 25.
315. See id.
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
319. See supra TABLES VII–VIII.

994

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:955

the government’s investment is a percentage of the total return of each
investment.320
Traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs serve as good comparisons to the cash flow
and yield-exempt models because they are close economic equivalents for
taxpayers due to similar funding practicalities. Where the IRAs are funded
through regular payroll savings plans, the investment, whether pre- or post-tax,
flows into the same investment, creating present value equivalents.321 Because
the future investments of earnings will be channeled into the same investments
tax-free, their actual future post-tax results would also be the same assuming
the same effective rate of tax.322
Corporations, however, do not fit this pattern.
Corporations are
continuously making new investments with new debt capital and retained
earnings, including tax savings.323 Returns can vary considerably and tax
savings may be delayed due to the inability to currently utilize net losses.324
Additionally, corporations do not fit precise molds. Even many non-financial
businesses have large holdings of cash and other financial assets.325 Thus, the
differences between real world outcomes and expected outcomes can
dramatically affect the nature of corporate consumption taxes. In the corporate
setting, one must consider what consumption taxes do and do not do with
respect to the taxation of capital income.
Consideration of these different methods demonstrates the inherent
difficulties in understanding the full implications of taxing capital income in
the consumption context. To see this, economists view capital income as
having three components: the riskless rate of return, the risk premium, and the
supernormal return or economic rents.326
The riskless rate of return is the guaranteed rate on receipts without chance
of default.327 The riskless rate of return is exempt from cash flow and
yield-exempt taxes, but is fully taxed by income taxes.328 The risk premium is
the additional return expected by investors to compensate them for
risk-taking.329 It is generally believed that the risk premium is not subject to
320. See supra TABLE X.
321. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 282, at 1110.
322. See id. (noting that the “theoretical equivalence” between the pre-tax and post-tax
treatments is destroyed without a “uniform, invariable rate of tax”).
323. See Steven A. Bank, Dividends and Tax Policy in the Long Run, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
533, 556 (2007) (discussing the sources of a firm’s capital).
324. Cf. Cunningham, supra note 160, at 39 n.78.
325. See Ben Casselman & Justin Lahart, Companies Shun Investment, Hoard Cash, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 17, 2011, at A2.
326. Cunningham, supra note 160, at 23. Professor Cunningham also notes the need to
eventually address an inflation premium. Id. at 23 n.32.
327. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 4, at 387 & n.27 (likening a risk-free rate of return
to the guaranteed interest derived from short-term treasury bills).
328. See Elkins & Hanna, supra note 160, at 103–04.
329. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 4, at 387–88 & n.30.
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either cash flow or yield-exempt consumption taxes.330 Often it is argued that
under certain assumptions, sophisticated investors can avoid the income tax on
the risk premium by changing one’s portfolio in favor of riskier investments.331
Economic rents, or inframarginal returns, are those yields above the risk-free
and risk premium components.332 Economic rents are subject to both income
taxation and cash flow taxation,333 but are not subject to taxation under the
yield-exempt model, because the tax is pre-paid on the basis of expected, not
actual, returns.334 Because economic rents are unexpected and cannot be
anticipated by the investor, they are not caught by a yield-exempt tax on
expected returns, but are subject to tax under cash flow principles.335
Economic rents would only be exempt if the investor could invest her tax
savings in a way that would earn economic rents of the same magnitude as the
original investment.336
Although the comparison of cash flow and yield-exempt consumption
systems with traditional and Roth IRAs aids in demonstrating how
consumption taxes work, conclusions must be reached carefully.337 Roth or
traditional IRAs are contrasting devices that will usually reach the exact same
result with the exception of changing tax rates.338 The analysis applies well to
non-entrepreneurial investors because any economic rent is in the nature of a
windfall to capital.339 Taxing businesses, however, is not so straightforward.
Corporations, unlike other investors, are in the business of earning economic
rents.340
Economic rents are included in the tax base of an R&F-type tax because it is
a pure cash flow tax that incorporates actual returns.341 The result under an
R-type tax is less predictable because the R-type is a hybrid cash flow tax;342 it
is a cash flow tax for most types of business income and operating
330. See Cunningham, supra note 160, at 26; see also Elkins & Hanna, supra note 160, at
103; How Much Capital Taxed, supra note 4, at 2–4.
331. This is based on a somewhat impractical pair of assumptions that a taxpayer can and
will increase his or her debt and can and will increase his or her exposure to risky investments in
order to undo the effects of the income tax. See Cunningham, supra note 160, at 29–30.
332. Id. at 23.
333. Id. at 24.
334. See How Much Capital Taxed, supra note 4, at 6.
335. See id. at 5.
336. When considering non-entrepreneurial investors, it may be reasonable to conclude that
economic rents are so unusual that these investors would normally never see them. For this
reason, the relevance of economic rents to the comparison of cash flow taxes is minimal for
non-entrepreneurial investors. See Cunningham, supra note 160, at 23–24.
337. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 282, at 1116.
338. Id. at 1113.
339. See Elkins & Hanna, supra note 160, at 100 & n.36 (quoting Warren, supra note 4, at 5).
340. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
341. See Barker, supra note 17, at 214.
342. See id. at 213; see also supra note 141 and accompanying text.

996

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:955

expenditures but a yield-exempt tax for financial flows.343 An R-type does not
include the economic rents generated by financial flows.344 The R- and
R&F-type would reach identical outcomes when a business does not have rents
from financial operations.345 Because the actual tax outcome would depend on
the unique mix of financial and non-financial activities of each business under
an R-type, the R&F-type presents a superior solution for all corporations.346
IV. THE POLITICS AND POLICY OF CORPORATE TAXATION
Any proposed corporate tax system must deal with the question: “Why tax
corporations on income?” Both income and cash flow taxes tax income in
some way. An ideal income tax taxes the entire return on capital only from
equity in the corporate setting.347 Cash flow taxes tax economic rents, or true
profits, while excluding the normal return on equity as well as debt.348
Whether the tax base is the normal return from capital, economic rents, or
both, these income components can also be in the tax base of shareholders.349
The justification for corporate taxation of income should reflect the
underlying nature of a corporation. There are several schools of thought. One
approach views the corporation as merely the aggregate of its owners.350 This
view leads to the widespread belief that taxing corporations offers a convenient
and practical way of indirectly taxing corporate shareholders.351 Because there
are fewer corporations than shareholders, corporate tax presents an easier
method of tax collection.352 In addition, corporate taxes provide an effective
way of taxing foreign shareholders.353 In sum, the aggregate view supports
corporate taxation as a substitute, or surrogate, for shareholder taxation. If
there were an effective way to directly tax shareholders, there would be no
need for corporate taxation.
The aggregate theory of corporations is not without deficiencies, thus
leading some scholars to a different theory of corporate taxation known as the
agency theory.354 This theory analyzes how the pass-through tax consequences
343. See supra notes 230–33 and accompanying text.
344. See Cunningham, supra note 160, at 23–24.
345. See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
346. See Barker, supra note 17, at 213–14.
347. See supra Part I.A; see also supra notes 159–62.
348. See supra notes 159–62.
349. See supra Part I.A.
350. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax 2 (John M. Olin Center for Law and Economics, Research Paper No. 04-006,
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=516202.
351. See id. at 3.
352. See id. at 7.
353. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 867; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 350, at 7.
354. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 350, at 12; see also Herwig J. Schlunk, I Come Not to Praise
the Corporate Income Tax, but to Save It, 56 TAX L. REV. 329, 347–49 (2003) (describing the
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of different corporate investments would impact management and some
shareholders differently.355 Consequently, management and shareholders may
not agree on an investment strategy.356 The corporate tax places all equity
holders in the same position in regard to different corporate investments.357
There is no need for the shareholders to agree. The tax on the shareholder’s
agent—the corporation—is incurred by the shareholder in exchange for the
corporation bearing the direct tax consequences of corporate activities, thus
avoiding those direct tax consequences that might not be in the shareholders’
interests.358
Another approach to the nature of corporations is the artificial entity theory,
which views the corporation as a creature of the state.359 Therefore, it is
reasonable for the state to impose a charge or a tax for the privilege of doing
business in corporate form.360 Though this rationale supports an independent
basis for taxing corporations, it neither demonstrates any relationship between
the benefit received and the payment due nor accounts for the fact that many of
the same benefits are provided to unincorporated entities.361 Although this
view recognizes corporate uniqueness, it does not provide a convincing
argument for how corporations should be taxed.
The most modern approach is the real entity view, which views the
corporation as an entity distinct from its owners.362 This represents a modern
view of finance and economics: owners are separated from the thing they own
and managers are really in control of the enterprise.363 Owners are no longer
“classical merchant adventurers” who combine their capital and talents, but
instead are true stockholders investing capital with professional

agency cost when management and shareholders are taxed at different rates than other
shareholders under pass-through taxation).
355. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 350, at 12; see also Schlunk, supra note 354, at 347–49.
356. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 350, at 12; see also Schlunk, supra note 354, at 347–49.
357. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 350, at 12; see also Schlunk, supra note 354, at 347–49. But
see Avi-Yonah, supra note 350, at 12–13 (finding the agency cost justification “unpersuasive”
and noting that inequities in personal income taxation still exist even though the corporation itself
is taxed at one rate).
358. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 350, at 12; see also Schlunk, supra note 354, at 347–49.
359. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 272–73 (1973); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 350, at 10.
360. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 359, at 272; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note
350, at 10. The corporate income tax was initially characterized as an excise tax assessed on the
privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity. It was on this basis that the Tariff Act of
1909 was sustained on constitutional grounds. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107,
115–16 (1911).
361. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 359, at 272; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note
350, at 10.
362. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 350, at 11–12.
363. Adolf A. Berle, The Impact of the Corporation on Classical Economic Theory, 79 Q.J.
ECON. 25, 30 (1965).
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administrators.364 In general, “[s]tockholders act like an unorganized, usually
inert, political constituency.”365 Management wields the real power of
corporations. The thought is that taxation of corporations is the result of the
recognition of corporate independence and power.
This view leads to two justifications for corporate taxation. First,
independent corporations have a separate ability to pay, and such control of
resources is a sufficient basis for taxation without regard to the tax’s incidence
on shareholders or others.366 Second, taxation is required to control and
regulate the power of management.367 In a world where corporations have
become the most significant global economic force, taxation provides a
mechanism for popular control.
Though these rival theories of corporate essence are expressed in terms of
their superior insights and truth value, each approaches the question of
corporate tax from a different viewpoint. The aggregate theory relies upon the
contractual and legal relations between corporations and their shareholders.368
This perspective justifies corporate tax only as a substitute for shareholder
taxation—a second best solution at most.369
The artificial entity theory is predicated on the legal relations between
corporations and the government.370 Entity taxation, though justified by this
approach, stands on rather flimsy grounds.371 A license fee makes more sense
under this justification.372
The real entity theory takes the perspective of modern corporate economic
reality.373 This theory dismisses shareholders as irrelevant and leaves the
corporation as a free entity possessing the capacity to pay taxes.374 However,
the most recent version of this theory shies away from the conclusion that this
provides a significant justification for corporate tax.375 Instead, the real entity
theory introduces public interest as a justification for taxing corporations, that
is, to regulate the enormous power of these entities in the public interest.376

364. Id. at 25, 37–39.
365. Id. at 31.
366. 2 ADRIAN A. KRAGEN & JOHN K. MCNULTY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 960 (3d ed.
1981).
367. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 350, at 12–13.
368. See id. at 7.
369. See id.
370. See id. at 10.
371. See id. (discussing the objections to the entity theory).
372. See 9 MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 26:16 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing
licensing fees as tools to regulate or raise revenue).
373. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 350, at 30.
374. See id. at 30–31.
375. See id. at 13.
376. See id. at 13, 34–35.
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Thus, corporate taxation is not economically justified, but politically required.
Taxation, once again, becomes a second-best solution.
It would be a mistake to dwell on the exclusivity of the approaches and fail
to appreciate the contribution they each make to our understanding of the
nature of corporations. The various perspectives of law, contracts, and
economics are valid in terms of the different ways corporations interact with
society and governments.377 These perspectives help explain why nations
uniformly apply income tax to corporations; yet none of the approaches
explains why any particular type of tax is appropriate for corporate taxation.378
None of these theories properly tackle the unique problems of corporate
taxation, which encompasses not only the taxation of corporations, but also the
taxation of shareholders.379 Practically all countries tax corporations and their
shareholders in a way that results in economic double taxation of the same
income.380 Many countries have sought ways to reduce the burden of
economic double taxation, but none have eliminated it completely.381
However, none of the theories highlighted above—from pre-payment on behalf
of shareholders to taxation as a means to regulate corporate
management—adequately justify double taxation.382
The late Professor Richard Musgrave and Peggy Musgrave provided the
classic argument against corporate double taxation in their work on public
finance.383 In dismissing taxation based on the notion “that a corporation has
an ability to pay of its own and should be subject to a distinct tax,” they said,
Obviously, all taxes must in the end fall on somebody, i.e., natural
persons. Corporate profits are part of the income of the shareholders
and, in the spirit of the accretion approach to the income tax, should
be taxed as part of their income. There is no reason why they should
either bear an extra tax or be given preferred treatment.384
Although the case for corporate double taxation has been problematic, the
case for general corporate taxation is very strong. Though there may be
disagreement over the reasons behind such a tax, most, including the
Musgraves, recognize its merit.385 Corporate tax in practice is based on a
strong political consensus. The public requires corporations to pay taxes

377. See id. at 2–3.
378. See id. Only the aggregate approach need not answer the question because the
corporation is paying the tax solely as the agent of shareholders. See id. at 7.
379. See id. at 13; see also supra Part I.A.
380. See Barker, supra note 14, at 650–51.
381. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 350, at 7–8; see also Barker, supra note 14, at 650–51.
382. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 350, at 13–14.
383. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 359, at 271–72.
384. Id. at 272.
385. Id. at 272–74.
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because corporations present a good source of revenue and it is perceived to be
just to tax bodies with control over large resources.386
Does a consumption tax imposed on corporations in lieu of an income tax
more adequately satisfy fundamental notions of fairness? In general, it is
thought to be fair to tax individuals on what he or she takes out of society
under a consumption tax.387 Also, nations tax individuals on income because it
is thought to be fair to tax people based on their ability to pay taxes, with
income considered the most practical base for measuring economic capacity.388
In this way, people are fairly taxed in accordance with their use of total societal
resources. This is based on the idea that people are members of societies, and
with that right (and the benefits that flow from it), come certain unique
Therefore, all individuals making use of society’s
obligations.389
benefits—both citizens and non-citizen residents alike—must pay their equal
share of taxes.390
In contrast, corporations do not consume in the same way as individuals.
Corporations have control over resources, but, as artificial persons, their
relation to the state and society cannot be described in the same way as
individuals.391 Despite these differences, income tax treats corporations like
individual residents or citizens.392 This status has been defined in various
ways. Corporations have been taxed on their income on the basis of formal
criteria such as legal status, place of incorporation, location of the principal
officers or board of directors, or on the basis of a more practical economic link
like principal place of business, or seat (location of principal officers).393
These approaches to corporate residency begin with a common viewpoint: a
corporation owes allegiance to a state in the same manner as an individual
does.
Corporations, as artificial persons, have many options regarding place of
incorporation or residence.394 Corporate residency can often be manipulated
for tax reasons and many corporations will avoid tax if they can.395 In a world

386. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 350, at 14 (“Ordinary Americans have a viscerally negative
reaction to the notion that large, profitable corporations should pay no tax while they bear the
income tax burden.”).
387. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 4, at 386.
388. See Graetz, supra note 4, at 1634–35.
389. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 359, at 193 & n.8.
390. See Taxation of Resident Aliens, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Dec. 2, 2011),
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/international/article/0,,id=96493,00.html (“A resident alien’s
income is generally subject to tax in the same manner as a U.S. citizen.”).
391. See Barker, supra note 14, at 665.
392. See id.
393. HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 434–36 (3d ed. 2010).
394. See Barker, supra note 14, at 664–65.
395. See id. at 664–66.
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where many of the factors of production are highly mobile, governments will
encourage migration with their laws and tax incentives.396
Corporations are different from individuals and standards of fairness should
encompass those differences. The essence of the individual’s relationship is
totality; individuals are social, political, and economic actors. The essence of a
corporation’s relationship is primarily economic.397 Consequently, effective
corporate taxation should consider first—and perhaps only—economic
justifications for tax.
In other contexts, double taxation in various forms is endemic. Nations first
tax individuals on income and later tax those same individuals on funds left
over after tax used for consumption.398 The difference between this pattern
and corporate tax is that the latter two taxes are both income taxes.
It is one thing to justify a tax on corporations for the reasons set out above,
where, in reality, the tax paid is “on account” of the ultimate obligation of its
shareholders.399 It is quite another to impose a tax on corporations that results
in economic double taxation of the same income.400 It is not enough to rest the
case for double taxation “on a nagging feeling that corporations, especially
large publicly-held corporations, are aggregates of capital, legal entities and
groups of managers . . . that have a capacity to pay.”401 A separate and distinct
tax on corporations should be justified on the basis of the unique benefits that
corporations derive from the state and from a country in general.
Three questions must be considered. First, do corporations receive unique
benefits that justify the imposition of a separate and distinct tax? Second, does
the tax imposed fairly relate to or assess those benefits? Third, is it fair to
impose a distinct tax that the shareholders ultimately must pay, which results in
a second charge for the same benefit?
A. Benefits of Corporate Status
There are many features that make a corporation special, but limited liability
is the historic key to the success of the corporation as a pivotal institution in
society today.402 Limited liability has two interrelated functions. It ensures
that shareholders are not liable for the debts of their firm beyond their capital
contributions.403 Consequently, it allows the firm to engage in risk-taking
396. See id. at 647; see also Barker, supra note 17, at 171–80 (describing tax competition);
supra Part I.B.
397. See Barker, supra note 14, at 665–66.
398. See 67B AM. JUR. Sales and Use Taxes §§ 5 & 6C (2012) (describing a sales tax on
consumer purchases and distinguishing sales tax from other taxes).
399. See supra text accompanying note 384.
400. See supra notes 379–84 and accompanying text.
401. KRAGAN & MCNULTY, supra note 366, at 960.
402. See Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1047 (1988–1989).
403. See id. at 1057–58.
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while limiting consequences to the shareholders.404 This gives shareholders
the potential opportunity to realize greater returns by investing in riskier
enterprises.405 The opportunity to employ limited liability can also be
considered a government subsidy or benefit.406 The Musgraves argue that,
although limited liability is of tremendous value to a corporation, it is
practically costless to society.407 Society, which includes the victims of
corporate disasters, might not agree.
An important consequence of limited liability is that it leads directly to the
efficient provision of capital: “[E]conomists would view the availability of
limited liability as an efficient way to organize the raising of large amounts of
capital and allocating risks.”408 Limited liability has given corporations,
especially those that are publicly traded, ready access to capital markets.409
This liquidity provides firms with a lower cost of capital.410
Corporate capital needs are, however, provided in different ways. Studies
indicate that there is very little market-raised equity, with one study finding
that firms derive only 2 to 3% of their new capital from shareholders.411 Most
corporate capital needs are derived from retained earnings, which are subject to
a single layer of corporate tax, and debt, which is only subject to one layer of
non-corporate tax.412
Ultimately, what makes a corporate investment truly unique is its liquidity,
which is made possible in part by the limited liability of shareholders and by
the public market for securities, both stocks and bonds.413 Shares of stocks and
corporate bonds can be turned into cash quickly through markets with high
volume, and consequently there is great certainty in the price at the moment of
Liquidity gives
sale because fluctuations in the price are low.414
stockholders—and to a large extent bondholders—the ability to enjoy higher
risk-adjusted returns from their investments than they would be able to from
illiquid investments.415 Marketability of these types of investments gives
investors the capacity to enjoy the benefits of long-term corporate investments
without the long-term commitment. Investors can choose the pattern of their
404. See id. at 1058.
405. See id.
406. See id.
407. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 359, at 292.
408. Gravelle, supra note 70, at 267.
409. See Rudnick, supra note 402, at 1113–14.
410. See id. at 1103.
411. Berle, supra note 363, at 38–39.
412. See supra notes 68–73 (covering taxation of retained earnings); see also supra notes
74–79 (summarizing taxation of corporate debt).
413. See Rudnick, supra note 402, at 1113–14, 1127–28.
414. See id. at 1128.
415. See Schlunk, supra note 354, at 343. The more liquid a security, the less risk ownership
of that security entails. Thus, the market demands a lower risk premium for more liquid
securities. See IBBOTSON, supra note 269, at 108.
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consumption by investing and divesting at any time.416 The state facilitates
such benefits through the maintenance and regulation of the financial markets,
which is essential for these opportunities to exist.417
Liquidity has also resulted in the separation of control from stockholder
ownership and vesting it in corporate management, granting management
control over the affairs of the corporation with little serious interference.418
Limited liability and liquidity have enabled investors to immunize their
investments from those of the corporation.419 The combination of these factors
has led to gargantuan business enterprises420 whose size alone gives
corporations a “social significance”421 that cannot be attributed to smaller
business enterprises.422
Nevertheless, does the burden of the corporate tax fairly relate to the benefits
derived by, and the nature of, the corporate enterprise? Both an income tax
and a cash flow tax reach the profits derived by corporate uniqueness,423 but
income taxation is over-inclusive.424 As this Article will demonstrate, only a
cash flow tax is limited to a tax on the unique profits earned by a corporation.
B. Cash Flow Tax as a Tax on the Unique Profits of Corporations
An important normative goal of taxation is that taxes are to be fairly
The general approach to fairness has
allocated among taxpayers.425
416. See Berle, supra note 363, at 39.
417. See id. at 32. These factors have led to the tremendous growth of corporate enterprises,
which are identified by their huge concentrations of economic power. The fact that corporations
can exist indefinitely helps foster long-term relations with both labor and other businesses, adding
tremendous intangible value to firms. See id. at 34–35. The corporate firm is fundamentally
different from the traditional market because its size and hierarchical structure make it possible to
avoid transactional costs by producing goods and services internally or through smaller captive
corporations. Id. at 27; Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937).
418. See Berle, supra note 363, at 30.
419. See Rudnick, supra note 402, at 1098–99.
420. See supra Part IV. For example, the capitalized share value of Apple and Exxon Mobil
as of February 2012 was $506 and $411 billion, respectively. See Peter Stevenson, Apple Market
Capitalization Tops $500 Billion, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 29, 2012, 6:11 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/29/apple-market-capitalization-500-billion_n_1310408.
html.
421. See Rudnick, supra note 402, at 1094 (quoting ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1933)).
422. See Barker, supra note 17, at 165 (providing an account of the dominance of
publicly traded corporations in the world economy). Such factors can lead to unique profits,
which some have argued yield excessive profits to corporate producers. Rudnick, supra note 402,
at 1074. Some of these profits can be characterized as monopoly profits produced by market
control and an achieved equilibrium with competitors. Berle, supra note 363, at 32.
423. Compare supra Part II.D, with infra Part IV.B.
424. See Gordon et al., supra note 152, at 982 (discussing frequent modifications from
comprehensive income tax to prevent over-inclusiveness).
425. Barker, supra note 14, at 665.
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emphasized two distinct concepts of fairness: a taxpayer should be taxed in
accordance with his or her ability to pay or a taxpayer should be taxed in
accordance with the benefits he or she receives from society.426 Corporate tax
cannot be merely a surrogate for the fair taxation of shareholders because it is a
uniform tax on those who are otherwise in incomparable situations. Justice
requires that a tax on corporations stand on its own.427 This requires taxation
on the basis of benefits received.428
The present state of knowledge supports the assumption that corporations
have the opportunity to make unique profits. Though these unique profits are
not certain, where they arise, unique profits would be a proper base for a
separate and distinct tax on corporations. These unique profits are called
economic rents.429 In economic jargon, a tax on economic rents is a true net
profits tax, allowing a deduction for the cost of all capital whether equity or
debt.430 As outlined in Part II, a cash flow tax targets the return over and
above the normal return from capital—the supernormal return or economic
rents.431 Depending on one’s assumptions of taxpayer behavior, the income
tax taxes part or all of the normal return from capital.432 The income tax also
overtaxes the risk-free return due to its inclusion of non-real inflationary gains
in the tax base.433
To many investors, economic rents can be a windfall to financial
investment.434 To those lucky few that can uncover investments with
economic rents, those gains are the product of the special talents or ingenuity
of the investor and are only tangentially related to a return on capital.435
Corporations, in contrast, are engaged in entrepreneurial and business activity,
which is essentially the business of earning rents.436 Corporations earn
economic rents in the global world “by cost leadership, by product
differentiation, and by focus[ing] on . . . particular market niche[s].”437
Economic rents are also often associated with monopoly power.438 There are
426. See William B. Barker, The Concept of Tax: A Normative Approach, in THE CONCEPT
TAX 21, 24–26 (Bruno Peters et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the various theories of just
taxation).
427. Barker, supra note 14, at 688 (arguing that international tax law should set aside current
systems and begin taxing corporations on their received benefit).
428. See id.
429. See Barker, supra note 17, at 211, 213.
430. RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 280–81 (8th ed.
2006).
431. See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text.
433. See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text.
434. See Cunningham, supra note 160, at 23–24.
435. See id. at 23 & n.34.
436. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 281.
437. Id.
438. See id.
OF
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five aspects of corporate structure that determine which firms are able to earn
economic rents over the long haul. These factors are a “rivalry among existing
competitors, the likelihood of new competition, the threat of substitutes, and
the bargaining power both of suppliers and customers.”439
Firms evaluate new projects in terms of economic rents, which can be
calculated by determining the Net Present Value (NPV) of a project.440 A
positive NPV is a return greater than the cost of capital.441 Economic value is
added to the firm where income earned from a project exceeds the cost of
capital multiplied by the investment.442 In the case of debt financing, NPV is
the present value of the expected stream of income minus depreciation less the
present value of interest and principle payments.443 In this way, the investment
adds value to the firm if there is residual income, also known as Economic
Value Added.444
The expected return is the normal return, which includes a risk-free return
plus a risk premium.445 This is the opportunity cost of capital that represents
the expected return for an equally risky investment.446 Put another way, it is
the return investors expect for waiting and taking risks.447 This presents a
conundrum. Shareholders are not interested in just any return but in an
investment producing economic rents, that is an NPV investment, which is
greater than a normal return.448 Yet shareholders only expect a normal return
that includes a premium for the level of risk they assume.449 But this normal
return is speculative because of the potential deviations in actual results that
are caused by “the varying but statistically unpredictable fortunes of the
firm.”450 Ownership of shares does not guarantee any return or even that a
shareholder will recoup his or her capital.451

439. Id.
440. See id. at 17, 281 (defining Net Present Value as the value of an asset today subtracted
by the investment required to obtain that asset).
441. See id.
442. Id. at 310–11.
443. Id. at 332.
444. Id. at 310–11 (Economic Value Added (EVA) equals residual income, which equals
income earned minus income required; income required equals income earned minus the cost of
capital times the investment).
445. See supra notes 326–29 and accompanying text (describing the three components of
capital income, including the riskless rate of return and the risk premium).
446. See BRADFORD, supra note 4, at 10.
447. See id.
448. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 310 (asserting that corporate shareholders seek
positive NPV investments only).
449. See BRADFORD, supra note 4, at 12.
450. See id.
451. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 145 (noting that Amazon’s stock prices rose
6,000% in one year, only to decrease by 90% in the next year).
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The consequence of corporate taxation is that shareholders get less. Is this
result acceptable double taxation? Because economic rents are extraordinary,
the opportunity to earn rents is not a serious factor in stock purchase and the
possibility has little effect on shareholder behavior.452 Corporate rents are a
windfall; their creation has nothing to do with the talents and skills of the
Human capital and monopoly power explain rents;
stockholder.453
supernormal returns are usually associated with the return from ideas, labor,
and management skills, or market power.454 Stockholders are capital owners,
not capital users.455 To the extent stockholders earn a normal return, they are
compensated for the risks they bear.456 Though stockholders own the residual
rights to rents, capital has not produced these rents—people have.457 Because
rents are a windfall to shareholder capital, taxation is fair.458
Those who purchase shares from others may be paying for previously earned
economic rents, which would naturally be reflected in the value of the
shares.459 The purchase price may also reflect the capital value of expected
rents including the future tax cost at the corporate level.460 These same
principles apply today to the income tax.461 Though these rents would not be a
windfall to capital, having been expected and paid for, not taxing them would
result in a tax windfall to the purchaser.462
Logic dictates that shareholders realize rents through dividends or capital
appreciation. It is, however, unlikely that stockholders receive rents
knowingly. Many corporations do not pay any dividends, while other
corporations pay them regularly.463 Dividends do not represent economic
rents, but instead merely represent a portion of the expected normal return on

452. See supra notes 448–49 and accompanying text.
453. See Elkins & Hanna, supra note 160, at 101 (quoting William M. Gentry & R. Glenn
Hubbard, Distributory Implications of Introducing a Broad-Based Consumption Tax, 11 TAX
POL’Y & ECON. 1, 6 (1997)).
454. See id.
455. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 6 (explaining how stockholders own the
corporation but do not manage it).
456. See supra note 449 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 453–54 and accompanying text.
458. See Elkins & Hanna, supra note 160, at 102.
459. Cf. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 420 (explaining how a higher dividend often
results in a higher stock price).
460. Cf. id. at 429–30 (explaining how a stock’s price will reflect expected future dividend
payments, including future taxes on those dividends).
461. See supra Part III (discussing how economic rents are subject to income taxation and are
taxed on the basis of expected return).
462. See Elkins & Hanna, supra note 160, at 102.
463. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 418.
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capital.464 Under a cash flow tax, the amount of profits representing dividends
would not be subject to tax.465
Indeed, in our system of stockholding, dividends are the only instance when
the reality of corporate earnings intrudes into the daily life of shareholders.466
Common sense suggests that a record of dividend paying will have an impact
on stock valuation,467 yet economists have three contradictory views. On the
right, it is asserted that the payment of dividends increases the value of the firm
(even though assets leave the corporate solution).468 On the left, it is asserted
that the payment of dividends decreases the value of shares.469 In the middle,
it is asserted that the payment of dividends has no effect.470 This lack of
theoretical consensus and supporting meaningful data suggest that there is
disconnect between corporate share value and distributed corporate profits.
The effect of economic rents on share value is even more problematic than
that of dividends. Rents are elusive, ephemeral, and are not a factor when the
only relevant concerns when investing in shares are price and dividends.471 It
was the late Adolf Berle who suggested that there was, at best, an indirect
correlation between share value and the value of a corporation as an operating
entity.472 Berle concluded that “the stock market[] . . . [is a] more or less
closed, system of property-holding . . . that . . . is essentially independent from
the actual productive processes.”473
464. Expected returns on shares of stock based on historical data include both an income
element (paid as a dividend) and a much larger element for capital appreciation. See IBBOTSON,
supra note 269, at 23. It is this return composed of a risk-free rate plus a risk premium that is
exempt from taxation at the corporate level under a cash flow tax. These “profits” would only be
subject to one level of tax at the shareholder level.
465. See supra notes 178, 464 and accompanying text.
466. See Berle, supra note 363, at 39.
467. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 420.
468. See id. at 428 (arguing that, because investors seek stocks with established dividends,
those stocks command higher prices).
469. See id. at 429–30 (arguing that, because investors prefer the tax advantages of capital
gains, stocks with dividend polices have depressed prices).
470. See id. at 433.
471. See Berle, supra note 363, at 39.
472. Id. at 37–38.
473. Id. at 38–39. In some cases, there exists indirect correlation between the risks and
benefits of stock ownership and the risks and benefits of corporate assets. John H. Davies, Public
Stock, Private Stock: A Model for the Corporate Income Tax, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 309 (1975).
This indirect correlation results from the specific risks borne by shareholders due to specific
industry risks or the unique properties of particular corporations. See BREALEY ET AL., supra
note 430, at 162. This is known as unique risk. See id. Though unique risk is accounted for in
the risk premium, it is not particularly important risk because it can be minimized by
diversification. See BRADFORD, supra note 4, at 10 (explaining the normal return as accounting
for the particular risks of the firm); see also BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 162. The most
significant risk for most shareholders is market risk, which is also known as systemic risk. Id. at
162 & n.27. Systemic risk generally springs from external macroeconomic factors that affect all
companies in a particular fashion, albeit with different magnitudes. See IBBOTSON, supra note
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The publicly traded corporation is a unique form of ownership in that “[i]t
has destroyed the unity that we commonly call property—has divided
ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it.”474
Many stockholders own shares indirectly through mutual funds and pension
plans run by corporate management with little idea of the companies they own,
let alone the risks and benefits of the individual companies contained in their
portfolios.475
The substantial disconnect between the underlying assets and business
activity of a corporation, which can be called inside value, and market value is
well illustrated by the insufficiency of meaningful corporate data.476 For
example, corporate accounting reflects the net book value of assets and
residual earnings for a corporation, “which is original cost less depreciation
computed according to some arbitrary schedule.”477 This is only an
approximation of the true value of some of the assets. For example, it was
reported that Heinz’s stated book value for its outstanding shares of stock was
$1.99 billion or $3.42 per share in April of 2003.478 Concurrently, Heinz’s
common shares were selling at $30 per share for a capitalized market value of
$10.5 billion.479
Valuation of intangibles is part of the reason for the huge discrepancy
between inside value and market value. Book value does not include most
intangible capital, which is comprised of visual assets, like patents and
trademarks, and also almost invisible assets like trade secrets, goodwill,
customer service, headquarters efficiencies, profits lost in order to establish
new markets, and all of the training and skills acquired by an established work
force.480 It has been estimated that the value of intangible capital may be as
high as one-third of all business assets.481 Despite its importance, the value of
intangible capital is merely conjecture.482
Due to the immeasurability of intangible capital, one cannot determine true
value, one can only observe the value of corporate assets or the corporate
enterprise by viewing the market value of the corporation’s outstanding
shares.483 It is the stock market price that has real consequences to the
269, at 45. Market risk takes into consideration the fluctuation in prices due to the economy as a
whole as opposed to individual corporate concerns. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 162.
Unlike unique risk, market risk is not diversifiable. Id. at 162 & n.27.
474. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 421, at 6–7.
475. Berle, supra note 363, at 28.
476. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 419.
477. See id. at 317.
478. Id. at 366.
479. Id.
480. See Fullerton & Lyon, supra note 146, at 64, 67–68.
481. See id. at 74.
482. See id. at 68, 72, 74.
483. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 316–17.
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shareholder.484 Standard finance texts tell us to trust market value, claiming
that the market reveals the true value of shares.485 In other words, the current
price is neither under- nor overvalued. An investor, therefore, is concerned
only with relative value, which is the value of shares today as opposed to their
value yesterday.486 The relationship between economic rents and share value
is only a matter of speculation.487 Consequently, it can be concluded that
shareholders are neither particularly interested in economic rents nor
significantly affected by them.488
Shareholders look for a normal return on their investment, calculated as the
sum of a risk-free return and a risk premium.489 This normal return would be
exempt from taxation under a corporate cash flow tax, resulting in only one
layer of taxation at the shareholder level.490 To the extent that economic rents
trickle down to shareholders, they are unexpected windfalls.491 In many cases,
rents may not accrue to shareholders at all.492 This is because there are several
constituents that vie for economic rents, including equity capital (dividends),
debt (contingent interest),493 and labor (greater wages and benefits).494
Management is in a unique position to capture rents through compensation in
the form of disproportionate salaries, non-taxed benefits, and stock options,
translating their efforts into capital return.495 Thus, economic rents present the
one fair base for taxing the profits of a corporation, even if those rents are
taxed twice.496
484. Id. at 75 (describing investors’ expectations for stock growth when observing stock
prices during the present day).
485. See, e.g., id. at 350 (stating that stock prices can be trusted in an “efficient market . . .
for they impound all available information about the value of each security”); id. at 348.
486. Id. at 348.
487. Id. at 281 (discussing the factors that influence the sustainability of economic rents).
488. See Elkins & Hanna, supra note 160, at 101–02 (describing the nature of supernormal
returns); see also supra notes 434–35 and accompanying text.
489. See supra notes 324–29 and accompanying text.
490. See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text.
491. See supra notes 434–35 and accompanying text.
492. See supra notes 452–58 and accompanying text.
493. Theoretically a loan of debt capital tax has a zero NPV because the rate is exactly
equivalent to the opportunity cost of capital. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 332–33.
Certain creditors, however, may be in the position to bargain for a share of economic rents in
addition to a normal return on capital.
494. Even customers might vie for a portion of the rents, but to the extent customers get
better prices, we would hesitate to classify these as rents. See, e.g., Elkins & Hanna, supra note
160, at 101 (arguing that supernormal returns should be defined as “returns on labor or as
windfalls”).
495. Consequently, there may be a case for limiting deductions for management
compensation in a cash flow system because excessive compensation represents economic rents.
On the other hand, since debt and equity receive identical treatment under a cash flow tax, it is
irrelevant whether rents are paid to shareholders or creditors. See supra note 159 and
accompanying text.
496. See supra notes 429–31 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the case for taxing economic rents to
corporations satisfies the important goals of corporate taxation: providing
revenue and regulating corporations in a way that can control management. A
separate cash flow tax on corporations taxes them in a way that directly reflects
the benefits they derive from society, which are fairly reflected in the tax
base.497 In general, cash flow taxes work in a way that is non-distortive and
economically efficient.498 Although all comprehensive cash flow taxes are
taxes on economic rents, a destination-based cash flow tax includes only those
rents that are clearly accessible by a nation because they are inextricably bound
to a nation’s domestic consumption.499
Recent data shows that corporate taxes as a percentage of GDP have
substantially declined since the 1960s.500 This decline is despite the fact that
corporations still account for over 80% of business activity in America.501
President Barack Obama’s tax-reform plan is to broaden the corporate tax base
by reducing or eliminating tax preferences while lowering corporate tax rates
to accomplish overall neutrality.502 Revenue neutrality will not reverse this
decline. Even loophole-closing with the existing tax rates would not
significantly reverse the trend because tax preferences only account for
approximately 8.6% of corporate taxable income.503
Other factors account for the decline in revenue more directly. First, many
large businesses have escaped the corporate tax by using pass-through
nontaxable entities.504 Second, an increasing number of corporations use a
higher percentage of debt-financing rather than equity financing, resulting in a
negative corporate tax on business profits.505 Third, national borders are
dissolving when seen from the perspective of multinational corporations and
global economics.506 Consequently, nation-states’ international tax regimes
are disintegrating in the face of the challenges of international tax
competition.507 The taxation of the foreign earnings of U.S. multinationals and
foreign corporations doing business in the United States is the result of a
flawed international system that exacerbates transfer pricing gambits and debt

497. See supra text accompanying notes 425–28.
498. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
499. See supra Part II.B (arguing that “only a destination-based cash flow tax will yield a
largely unavoidable corporate tax”).
500. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
501. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
502. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
503. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
504. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
505. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
506. See Barker, supra note 17, at 171–80.
507. See id.
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financing.508
Imports substantially reduce tax revenue.509
Proposed
international tax solutions include source-based territorial taxation,510 but
neither loophole-closing nor the adoption of a territorial income tax can cure
the basic problems of corporate tax.
This Article has outlined the need for a paradigm shift from a corporate
income tax to a corporate cash flow tax. Unlike other cash flow proposals that
suggest an origin-based cash flow tax for all,511 cumulative research indicates
that the adoption of a destination-based cash flow tax solely for corporations
and other large businesses is the optimal corporate tax scheme.512 A
destination-based cash flow tax for corporations and other large businesses
would practically eliminate the problems of the corporate income tax,
including tax preferences to international tax issues. It accomplishes this by
taxing all gains from U.S. consumption, both real and financial, leaving the
taxation of labor income to workers and the normal returns from capital to
investors under the income tax system.513 A destination-based cash flow tax
reverses the income tax bias for foreign production by taxing all sales for
domestic consumption while excluding export sales.514 A destination-based
cash flow tax allows a deduction for all costs other than those for imported
goods and services.515 It protects the domestic tax base by completely
removing the foreign element from the equation.516 Cash flow taxes present a
fair and economically sound base for taxing corporations.
A cash flow tax on corporations would also benefit shareholders. Cash flow
taxes remove the normal return from capital from the corporate tax base by
equalizing the tax treatment of debt and equity.517 Economic double taxation
of corporate income would be of no practical importance. Shareholders would
have the added bonus of effective information on corporate profitability
derived directly from corporate income tax returns, which would measure the
true profit from shareholder’s capital and would be a direct measure of
management performance.518

508. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text.
509. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 853–55.
510. See supra Part II.B (discussing origin-based and destination-based territorial tax
systems).
511. See Barker, supra note 14, at 690–93.
512. See supra notes 194–200 and accompanying text.
513. See supra notes 194–200 and accompanying text.
514. See supra notes 194, 196–97 and accompanying text.
515. See Barker, supra note 14, at 695.
516. See id.
517. See id. at 689.
518. See supra text accompanying notes 425–28.
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